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ABSTRACT 
 Since the 1950s, the political landscape of Nepal has undergone a series of 
changes, transitioning from monarchy to a federal democratic republic. In the process, it 
experienced recurrent political instability in the form of power-centric partisanship, a 
Maoist insurgency, volatile attempts at constitution adoption, and country-wide civilian 
protests. Theoretically, such upheavals should have produced intervention by the Nepali 
Army (NA) in the political system. Instead, the military has been headed by a civilian 
master in the form of either an executive or constitutional monarch—ceremonial 
presidents as a symbol of authority, and mainly as executive prime ministers. This thesis 
illustrates the inherent institutional attributes of the NA that circumvent possibilities of a 
military coup in Nepal. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1950s, the political landscape of Nepal has undergone an overhaul, 
transitioning from monarchy to a federal democratic republic. In the process, it experienced 
recurrent political instability in the form of power-centric partisanship, a Maoist 
insurgency, volatile attempts at constitution adoption, and country-wide civilian protests. 
To put it into perspective, since 1950, Nepal has had several constitutions (1951, 1959, 
1962, 1990, 2006, 2015), a referendum on the system of government (1980), two 
constituent assembly elections (2008 and 2013), and a decade-long insurgency (1995–
2006).1 In Huntington’s framework, Nepal would represent a case of political decay rather 
than political development.2 For Perlmutter, such a situation presents the right “social 
conditions contributing to praetorianism.”3 To Finer, similar conditions give the right 
opportunity for military intervention.4  
Theoretically, such upheavals should have produced the obvious intervention by 
the Nepali Army (NA) in the political system. It is clear, however, that since the 1950s, the 
Nepali military has been headed by a civilian master. This civilian control has taken the 
form of either executive or constitutional monarchs, ceremonial presidents as a symbol of 
authority, or mainly as executive prime ministers. Yet, for unexplained reasons, the NA 
did not do justice to any of the arguments presented by Huntington, Finer, or Perlmutter. 
Instead, the NA has embraced change set by the civilian leaders. Given this background, 
the thesis investigates the inherent institutional attributes within the NA that circumvents 
coups d’état. 
 
1 “Nepal Profile - Timeline,” BBC News, February 19, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-
asia-12499391. 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT.; London: Yale 
University Press, 2006), 4. 
3 Amos Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-
Military Relations in Developing Polities,” Comparative Politics 1, no. 3 (1969): 385, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/421446. 
4 Samuel Edward Finer, The Man on Horseback (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Publisher, 2006), 72. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Why has the NA never staged a coup despite recurrent political upheavals in Nepal 
since the 1950s? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
First, answering the question leads to an understanding of the behavior of militaries 
in constantly changing political scenarios through the case of the NA. Examining instances 
of the NA adapting to the political changes, while Nepal transitioned from monarchy to a 
republic, can provide valuable insights for civil-military relations (CMR) scholars. In 
addition, it provides a different lens through which to identify the nature of NA vis-à-vis 
its relations with the civilian masters since the 1950s.  
Second, the question allows research at the micro level, unlike most CMR research 
projects on Nepal, which are macro-level analyses of the NA vis-à-vis its relations with the 
executive and the society. It is imperative to understand this relationship, as it is much 
deeper than usually portrayed. In fact, very little attention is given to the historical facts, 
for instance the NA’s role in the nation-building process, or its nationwide ritualistic 
participation at the grassroot-community-level cultural ceremonies that mark historical 
events. Historically, the NA is older than the modern state of Nepal itself. Most CMR 
literature on Nepal tend to disregard this factor and is therefore incomplete. 
The question also gives an alternative point of view to understand the employment 
of the NA in various political upheavals, rather than viewing it with a blanket perception 
of a praetorian army. Unlike the judgmental narratives that constantly appear in the CMR 
of Nepal that portray it as a facilitator of coups, the question bears importance as it 
highlights legal provisions in the employment of the military as a benchmark for military 
actions that have never resulted in a coup. The research therefore contributes to the study 
of the CMR of Nepal that presents unusual conditions rather than applying a top-down 
approach of applying CMR theories developed in a different context to Nepal.  
The question is significant to CMR theories, Nepali history scholars, members and 
scholars of the NA, and, in general, whoever wants to understand the NA through data 
rather than through face-value narratives. Given the military strength, popularity, and scope 
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of its missions, combined with political upheavals, the absence of military coups is quite a 
phenomenon. Above all, the non-existent coverage of this phenomenon for so long in the 
field of Nepali CMR is itself questionable. Therefore, it is a significant question that needs 
to be addressed. 
Finally, the question is relevant to policymakers of Nepal where a constantly 
shifting democratic exercise has become the pattern in Nepali politics since 1950, requiring 
sensible and well-informed decision making. The question therefore seeks answers that go 
beyond existing literature on the CMR of Nepal. This question is also potential food for 
thought for policymakers to go beyond the lens of CMR theories and gauge the 
exceptionality of Nepali CMR that circumvents coups time and again by embracing change 
while disregarding praetorianism. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review gives readers an understanding that evolution of CMR 
theories is a constant phenomenon, and the study of Nepal allows such theories to evolve 
towards providing a more sophisticated framework for understanding countries that do not 
share western experiences. The literature review is presented in three parts. To set the stage, 
the first part examines theories of praetorianism and military coups, as this character of the 
military necessitated CMR theories in the first place. The second part investigates 
prominent control-oriented theories of CMR that explain how these theories aim to control 
the praetorian character. The final part explores literature related to changing politics and 
the CMR of Nepal, which explains the absence of vital data-based study in the field of 
Nepali CMR. 
1. Praetorianism and Military Coups  
The concept of praetorianism, praetorian state, society, and system remain 
important in the literature of CMR scholars as they seek to contain such behavior in the 
military. Technically, the purpose and context (competing for political authority or political 
participation) are not necessarily different except for the organization involved in politics 
such as the military, student unions, political parties, elites, masses, etc. In his seminal 
work Political Order in Changing Societies, Huntington broadens the spectrum of 
4 
praetorianism. As he explains, “Praetorianism in a limited sense refers to the intervention 
of the military in politics,” but he insinuates that the absence of a particular term for 
politicization of various social forces allows such forces to be termed as “praetorian 
society,” which serves the same purpose.5 He further elucidates, “In a praetorian system 
social forces confront each other nakedly,” with no legitimate intermediaries.6 Therefore, 
when Huntington uses the term to explain political decay, he means to use it in a broader 
term and not just in the military sense.  
Further amplification can be found in Huntington’s Political Development and 
Political Decay. He identifies praetorian states oscillating “between extreme democracy 
and tyranny.”7 Despite similar oscillations and underperforming political institutions, 
however, Huntington’s comparison between civic polity and praetorian societies8 does not 
reflect Nepal’s military. The absence of coups and direct intervention in Nepali politics 
therefore takes the NA out of the scope of praetorian society, regardless of the fact that 
Nepal is still struggling for political stability.  
Conceivably, the most relevant literature to Nepal is Samuel E. Finer’s work The 
Man on Horseback. Finer’s relevance to this thesis is in two parts. First, his description of 
the relationship between “the levels of intervention” and “the levels of political culture” 
gives a template to measure possible outcomes9 during the various political regimes of 
Nepal. Second, in Finer’s words, Nepal is a “proto-dynastic regime” where “the military 
are the decisive political factor.”10 Though the changes in the political system have now 
made Finer’s classification of Nepal as “empirical autocracies and oligarchies”11 
redundant, the argument does leave some room to gauge the current position of the NA. 
 
5 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 195. 
6 Huntington, 196. 
7 Samuel P. Huntington, “Political Development and Political Decay,” World Politics 17, no. 3 (1965): 
417, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009286. 
8 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198. 
9 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 139. 
10 Finer, 3. 
11 Finer, 4. 
5 
His arguments of disposition requiring motive and mood in the military to intervene, 
however, particularly the mood, are in a psychological realm. This psychology, however, 
is rather leadership oriented and should have resulted in different outcomes in different 
times. But the NA has had a rather uniform adherence to all regimes that transitioned from 
one to the other, without military coups despite political upheavals. The historical events 
clearly show the NA’s loyalty to the executive based on existing constitutional provisions, 
until changed by either interim legislation or new constitution. 
Amos Perlmutter’s The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a 
Taxonomy of Civil Military Relations in Developing Polities provides specific perspective 
vis-à-vis “social conditions contributing to military praetorianism.” 12 He narrows down 
the definition of a modern praetorian state as the “one in which the military tends to 
intervene and potentially could dominate the political system.”13 Citing Huntington, he 
clarifies praetorianism as being “a useful operational tool to explain a relationship between 
political development and modernization.”14 This explanation bears weight also to 
historically explain the political development of Nepal and foresee the future. Key 
takeaways from his work are his classification of the types of praetorian armies, which is 
a definitive template to piece together the kinds of military intervention. His justification 
of the Thai Army’s praetorian behavior rooted in traditional bureaucracy15 is not 
reasonable, however, as all militaries are bureaucratic, but not all are traditionally 
praetorian. Though in a different book, Perlmutter contradicts himself and explains that 
“The military profession is a voluntary one…confined to a bureaucratic-hierarchical 
situation.”16 The same could also be said for NA as it is professional and bureaucratic, yet 
 
12 Perlmutter, “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army,” 385. 
13 Perlmutter. 
14 Perlmutter. 
15 Perlmutter, 402. 
16 Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times: On Professionalism, Praetorians, 
and Revolutionary Soldiers (London, New Haven, 1977), 1. 
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traditionally older than the Thai Army,17 but with no record of a coup. This reality further 
demonstrates that the NA, though traditionally bureaucratic, has not resorted to coup d’état. 
Perhaps a more convincing theory to identify how countries repeatedly handle 
coups professionally is given by Naunihal Singh in his work, Seizing Power: The Strategic 
Logic of Military Coups. He argues that success or failure of military coups “rests entirely 
upon what happens within the military once the coup attempt begins.”18 He further 
elucidates that the intra-military factions usually tend to challenge coups, so he applies 
game theory’s coordination game to define the behavior of the mostly undecided masses 
within the military, whose support is detrimental. For Singh, the result of the coordination 
game—or in this instance military coups—depends on convergence of incentivized 
collective action (i.e., “If you change the players’ expectations, you change their behavior 
as well.”)19 A three-tiered approach to his work gives an idea of the difference between 
the coups staged from the top, the middle, and the bottom and the range of activities these 
tiers are likely to take to manage the convergence of incentivized collective action. 
Irrespective of the fact that Nepal never experienced an independent military-staged coup, 
the coordination game theory as proposed by Singh is equally meaningful to gauge military 
behavior during civil-military collusion and differences. 
2. Control-Oriented Theories of CMR 
Coups d’état, the quintessential embodiment of military intervention in politics, 
give momentum to control-oriented theories of CMR. Unlike the relatively recent 
arguments of “the trinity of control, effectiveness and efficiency,”20 most CMR theories 
have a narrower view of curtailing the possibilities of insubordination by the military. 
Given the increasingly unconventional missions of the NA, ranging from infrastructure 
 
17 “History of the Nepali Army,” Nepali Army, accessed May 13, 2020, 
https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/page/history. 
18 Naunihal Singh, Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2014), 5, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ebook-nps/detail.action?docID=3318826. 
19 Singh, 6. 
20 Florina Christiana Matei, “A New Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” in Routledge 
Handbook of Civil Military Relations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 26–35. 
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development to nature conservation,21 the control-oriented CMR theories are insufficient 
to examine the CMR of Nepal. More importantly, the interpretation of the increasing 
missions of the NA, sometimes also in the form of aiding the civil authority (stability 
operations), has mischaracterized them as praetorianism in the past. These theories hold 
value to understand the CMR psychology (who guards the guardians?), however, as 
opposed to the dynamic nature of CMR, unique to the political relationships between 
various stakeholders in a state. 
Pioneering the control theory field, Samuel P. Huntington argued for maximizing 
military professionalism through objective civilian control, or “by militarizing the military, 
making them the tool of the state.”22 Though it kindled the interest of many, it has been 
widely scrutinized by other CMR scholars.23 Particularly, professionalism itself has been 
the point of contention. Although The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations hints that “antimilitary ideologies” may be reasons for military 
dominance in the government in western societies,24 such beliefs do not correctly reflect 
developing democracies. It may be useful in generalizing the type of CMR control in 
Nepal, but it does not provide a theoretical framework from which to study the absence of 
military interventions. This research thus aims to examine such absence in Nepal. 
Morris Janowitz’s “convergence theory” takes a rather sociological approach to his 
CMR theory. Unlike Huntington, he points out that the separation of the military from the 
civilian is at the heart of the problem, which “runs the risk of creating new forms of tension 
and unanticipated militarism.”25 He argues that the modern military is “continuously 
prepared to act,” maintains “protected military posture,” and is directed by “the minimum 
 
21 “Nepali Army Beyond Primary Duties,” Nepali Army, accessed May 4, 2020, 
https://www.nepalarmy.mil.np/page/bpd. 
22 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), 83. 
23 Thomas C. Bruneau, “Impediments to the Accurate Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations,” 
in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013), 13–21. 
24 Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 95. 
25 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: The Free 
Press of Glencoe, 1960), 440. 
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use of force,” which makes it a “constabulary force.”26 His theory bears importance as it 
is ideally the closest to NA’s military posture in a limited sense and is cognizant of the 
evolving roles of the military. His spectrum of engagement is too wide (from nuclear to 
overseas bases),27 however, and goes beyond the NA’s constitutionally defined roles and 
responsibilities. This theory definitely justifies the NA’s embedded role in the Nepali 
society and its peacekeeping role, but it does not capture the political reality of Nepal, 
which is more complex as this research will illustrate.  
Later, Peter D. Feaver acknowledged CMR as “the entire range of relationships 
between the military and civilian society at every level”28 but which at its core implies 
control. He uses “agency theory” based on “principal-agent framework” to explain changes 
in the CMR of the United States during and after the Cold War.29 Feaver limits the CMR 
to a “working and shirking” relationship; working implies obedience by the military (the 
agent), while shirking implies avoidance of orders, deserving punishment by the civilian 
masters (the principal).30 While he is doubtful of its application in other political 
settings,31 its application in a “flawed democracy” like Nepal makes little sense.32 
Therefore, this lens does not encompass the intricacies of the CMR of Nepal.  
Interestingly, Michael C. Desch’s Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing 
Security Environment puts forward the combination of intensity and types of threats 
influencing CMR. He points out that domestic political violence “has been one of the 
primary precipitants of the complete breakdown of civilian control of the military in 
 
26 Janowitz, 418. 
27 Janowitz, 418–19. 
28 Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (June 1, 
1999): 211–41, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.211. 
29 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 1. 
30 Feaver, 3. 
31 Feaver, 12. 
32 “Democracy Index 2019,” The Economist Intelligence United, accessed May 19, 2020, 
https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index. 
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various countries.”33 His analogy of the “four combinations of threats—high or low, 
external or internal” also provides a template to gauge the level of civilian control of the 
military.34 His argument that military engagement in insurgencies undermines civilian 
authority cannot be the benchmark of a failing CMR, however. In fact, counter-
insurgencies are military-run operations in most cases. In Nepal’s case, the NA was 
mobilized to counter the Maoist-insurgency, but under constitutional accord granted by the 
civilian authority. Hence, Nepal remains a distinctive case, even by Desch’s empirical 
examples.  
Nonetheless, James Burk provides the most compelling diagnosis of various 
theories of democratic CMR that consider the dichotomy between liberal and civic-
republican values of a democratic state.35 He rightly identifies the differences in the 
approach to define CMR problem between a liberal democratic theory and the civic-
republican theory. According to Burk, the former (represented by Huntington) is concerned 
with protecting democratic values while the latter (represented by Janowitz) is concerned 
with sustaining democratic values through civic-participation.36 He also recognizes that 
there is no one-size-fits-all democratic CMR theory as it “is vaster today and demands a 
more varied and comprehensive treatment than it has yet received.”37 Though his scope of 
study is primarily directed towards Western militaries, this revelation is significant as it 
helps to contextualize Nepali CMR based on local events. Furthermore, it provokes a 
debate, if Nepal should protect democratic values (liberal democracy) or widen civic-
participation (civic-republican) to sustain democracy, considering Nepal a federal 
democratic republic. 
 
33 Michael C. Desch, Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment, Johns 
Hopkins Paperbacks, 2001 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 5. 
34 Desch, 6. 
35 James Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 29, no. 1 
(October 1, 2002): 7–29, https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X0202900102. 
36 Burk, “Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations,” 12. 
37 Burk, 22. 
10 
Lately, CMR scholars have acknowledged that a rather parochial view of control 
alone is insufficient to address CMR issues. Citing Feaver’s “civil-military 
problematique,” Bruneau and Croissant have strongly argued that “civilian control 
concerns one side of the civil-military problematique, military effectiveness concerns the 
other side.”38 Although they agree that pinpointing effectiveness is elusive, they highlight 
effectiveness being ascertained by preparedness to accomplish assigned roles and 
missions39 measured against three key attributes.40 “Defense planning” involving multiple 
agencies, “structures and processes” to formulate and implement the plan, and finally 
“resources.”41 The wide empirical study on their “control-effectiveness nexus” ranging 
from democracies to non-democratic states also concludes that “while civilian control may 
be necessary for military effectiveness, democratic civilian control is not.” This finding 
further justifies that CMR greatly differs between nations, and Nepal is no exception.  
A more recent article by Matei and Halladay, acknowledging a widened spectrum 
of missions and roles of the armed forces, advocates efficiency in addition to effectiveness 
and democratic civilian control.42 In light of post-Cold War missions, the article stresses 
the inclusion of security sectors (military, police, and intelligence) into “the 21st-century 
civil-military calculus.”43 It also pinpoints the importance of military behavior during 
democratic consolidation,44 which resonates with the NA’s behavior during political 
transitions. The automatic inclusion of efficiency in the equation of democratic-civilian 
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control of the military45 triggers a need to critically analyze the Nepali defense budget 
since the 1950s. It also reinforces that “effectiveness is elusive in practice as well as in 
principle.”46 The article concludes by suggesting the “enduring benefit of the nation” 
through “dialogue and compromise about matters of policy between civilian and military 
leaders, as well as mutual insight, knowledge and understanding.”47 Yet it lacks the 
solution to the looming trust deficit of the armed forces by the civilian masters. This 
psychology gives rise to the archetypal urge to control the military in the first place, which 
in Nepal is a much later discovery; the relationship has always been more than war-fighting 
alone. Therefore, Nepali CMR needs deeper study, which this thesis proposes to do. 
3. Changing Politics and CMR of Nepal  
While there is a lack of literature on coups in Nepal, some scholars have suggested 
that the royal takeover by King Mahendra in 1960 and by King Gyanendra in 2005 were 
military-assisted coups.48 Though the deployment of the military is often debated legally, 
the literature is not convincing in its definition of a military coup or for that matter a 
praetorian army or even a modern pretorian state. The closest Nepal has come to a coup 
can be traced back to an attempted coup made by Kunwar Indrajit Singh back in 1952, 
where an armed government entity known as Rakshya Dal seized government buildings, 
the airport, and communications and which was later crushed by the army.49 This event is 
in fact a good example of an incentivized collective action failing to converge based on 
coordination game theory proposed by Naunihal Singh, explained earlier.  
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The peer reviewed article Civil Military Relations and the Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal by Prakash Nepali and Phanindra Subba chronologically tries to identify CMR in 
Nepal leading to Maoist insurgency. It sufficiently explains the scrutiny over the military 
prior to and during the insurgency and gives an account of the lack of confidence in the 
civilian political elites on the loyalty of the military. It provides misleading ideas on 
monarchs’ intent to woo “the army while emasculating it as a political force” on the one 
hand, while on the contrary not granting “an explicitly political orientation or role.”50 
While it indicates the struggle between the king and the multi-party camp, it fails to explain 
the legalities to which the parties agreed to mobilize the army. Rather, it insinuates a non-
cooperation from the military to go against the Maoists insurgents.51 Most importantly, the 
claim that the “peasant stock under the leadership of junior and middle ranking officers 
mostly from middle-class and lower-middle class backgrounds” bear the brunt of 
countering the insurgency is unsubstantiated.52  
The duo’s article also fails to mention the Internal Security and Development 
Program (ISDP) carried out by the government in 2001 to respond to security and 
developmental challenges.53 Therefore, unlike the authors’ claim of military 
insubordination, the constitutional focus of the NA to mobilize during the ISDP and later 
under the state of emergency has not been included. The military has implicitly been given 
a subtle political flavor of a praetorian army and has been used loosely without a substantial 
theoretical framework of praetorianism. These lapses clearly show a wider 
misunderstanding of NA’s character, which at times is laced with uncorroborated 
praetorian narratives. Legally, the NA’s mobilization has always been constitutional as 
opposed to political interventions by the NA.  
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The immediate aftermath of the end of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, however, 
leading to the culmination of possibly the most conspicuous CMR tussle in Nepal, has had 
rather mixed after-action reviews. The tussle ended with the resignation of the sitting prime 
minister and the reversal of his decision by the president, while the mainstream media 
including the opposition accused him of unconstitutionally sacking the chief of the NA.54 
On the contrary, some literature present it as a notable case of military insubordination to 
civilian supremacy.55 Arturo C. Sotomayor in his article The Nepalese Army: From 
Counterinsurgency to Peacekeeping, while conforming to his book Myth of the Democratic 
Peacekeeper: Civil Military Relations and the United Nations, labels the subject as “Coup 
predisposition and lack of civil-military interpenetrability [Sic],”56 in an effort to prove the 
NA’s international engagement being counterproductive to security sector reform.57 While 
both his arguments are debatable, the coup predisposition angle in particular never 
materialized into a coup. It is evident that the case of the NA is an anomaly, and it 
constantly circumvents coups, despite opportunity and hint of disposition as identified by 
Sotomayor. His persistence on security sector reform may have led him to forgo 
constitutional provisions, thereby taking these events as insubordination, but as time would 
tell, there were no coup predispositions at all. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis will test the following hypotheses: 
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(1) The NA circumvents coups because of its neutral political relationship with 
the state. 
Historically, NA is intertwined with the nation-building process. With the evolution 
of a participatory form of politics in Nepal, however, especially after the 1950s, the NA’s 
behavior is found to be neutral and away from partisan politics. The NA has legally backed 
different regimes as they have come to power and accepted changes in the CMR. The 
attempt at staying neutral has allowed the NA to avert any possibilities of becoming a 
political force. It has avoided coups as part of remaining a neutral force. 
(2) The NA deliberately circumvents coups and it is institutionally driven. 
The disposition according to Finer is manifested in the form of motive and mood. 
In Nepal’s case, the motive and the mood are institutionally driven as opposed to being 
motivated by personal behavior. A clear pattern in the decision making of NA leaders can 
be observed particularly in times of severe CMR tensions, and the outcome of such 
tensions, that are devoid of military coups d’état. 
(3) The NA circumvents coups because of self-preservation instincts.  
The institutional obligation to preserve the institutional integrity, and the 
organizational cohesion of the NA, drives the NA to circumvent coups. The restraint 
against coups complements the NA’s institutional cohesion as such restraint keeps the NA 
from being a political force. Therefore, the decision making of the NA leadership, during 
times of CMR tensions, is driven by institutional obligations to maintain the cohesion and 
integrity of NA.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN  
The research is a qualitative historical analysis of the NA in relation to various 
CMR theories and ideas documenting Nepali CMR. It chronologically traces major 
political events resulting in political change and studies the NA’s adjustment to those 
changes. The research critically examines the CMR during such changes to test the 
specified hypotheses. The CMR vis-à-vis the NA and the civilian authority is examined 
through the prism of established CMR and political science theories. In addition, this 
15 
research analyzes both primary and secondary source literature that assume credibility 
specific to CMR and political science as well as credible news and articles related to events 
concerning the politics and CMR of Nepal. This research also investigates recorded print 
stories, audiovisual interviews, and speeches of dignitaries involved politically or militarily 
in Nepal.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW  
This thesis contains five chapters. A chronological analysis of the CMR of Nepal 
and power transitions, and the related explanatory theories are covered in Chapter II. 
Chapter III examines the NA’s historical relationship with the people and the state, its 
contribution to the nation-building process, and the NA’s role in the peaceful conclusion 
of political transitions since the 1950s. The chapter also explains the NA’s expanding roles, 
including its engagement in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions, as a means 
to further Nepal’s international profile. Chapter IV expands on the institutional influencers 
that obligate the NA’s decision making to preserve its organizational and institutional 
integrity and cohesion. Finally, Chapter V concludes the thesis and presents a summary of 
findings and recommendations. 
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II. COUP D’ÉTAT: THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE IN NEPAL    
Since the 1950s, the four major power transitions in Nepal have materialized 
without military coups d’état. Understanding this absence of military coups d’états in Nepal 
requires understanding the intricacies of transition of political power in Nepal in relation 
to theories of military intervention in politics. Such transitions have been the results of 
political struggle between the Ranas, the monarchs, the democratic movements, and later 
the Maoists. Consequently, the political changes led to internal crisis and threats to national 
stability and sovereignty. At times, the power transitions also threatened the NA’s cohesion 
and its corporate self-interest. Likewise, the new political masters routinely sought to 
dislodge the NA’s link with the vanquished powers, while new legal and constitutional 
arrangements secured the NA’s dependability with respect to the succeeding elites. 
Eventually, such transitions were successful in establishing completely new forms of 
government, including new obligations with respect to CMR.  
Several theories suggest that the military at times of internal crisis, such as threats 
to national stability, sovereignty, and threats to its position, will likely challenge the regime 
in power.58 Nevertheless, since the 1950s, despite providing sufficient conditions for a 
military takeover, all transitions of power never produced a coup. The power transitions in 
Nepal since the 1950s and the instability that followed are devoid of military takeovers. 
Likewise, the nationwide instability that followed political transitions was largely left to 
the management of the political elites. The four major power transitions since the 1950s 
and the NA’s acceptance of the post-transition CMR therefore stand out as a unique 
phenomenon that directly contradicts theories of military intervention in politics.  
A. POWER TRANSITION I: THE END OF THE RANA REGIME (1951) 
The end of the Rana regime displays three distinct attributes that shaped the 
political course of Nepal and that establish conditions for military takeovers according to 
theories of military intervention. First, the political compromise between the Ranas, the 
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monarch, and the Nepali Congress (NC), which was mediated by India, inevitably 
influenced the political course of Nepal but largely undermined Nepal’s sovereignty. 
Second, the co-option of the Rana elites by the new system as part of the political 
compromise led to the dissolution of the majority of the NA rank and file, against the 
corporate self-interest of the NA. Finally, the political instability that resulted from party 
politics and infighting within the NC eventually laid the groundwork for the next transition 
of power. In essence, these attributes provided theoretical conditions—Finer’s disposition 
(manifest destiny and corporate self-interest of the military) and opportunity (overt crisis) 
to intervene calculus, Desch’s logic of low external and high internal threat, and 
Perlmutter’s social conditions—for a possible coup d’état by the military.59         
The year 1950 marked the culmination of organized political movement against the 
Rana regime, who had been ruling the country since 1846.60 King Tribhuwan took asylum 
in the Indian embassy in March 1950 and later escaped to India while joining with the 
democratic forces, mainly the NC. This alliance reinforced the movement against the 
Ranas. The political as well as armed movement both from within and outside Nepal 
ultimately led to the regime’s demise in 1951.61 Meanwhile, the newly independent India 
negotiated the terms between the Ranas, the monarch, and the NC that was leading the anti-
Rana movement.62 Eventually, King Tribhuwan returned and an interim government was 
formed, guided by The Interim Government of Nepal Act, 1951,63 which incorporated both 
Ranas and non-Rana ministers.64 The Interim Government of Nepal Act, 1951 also 
formally dislodged the NA’s link with the old regime while establishing the king as the 
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supreme commander of the NA. The praetorian oligarchy ended formally, and a new 
political era began.  
The role of newly independent India in the political course of Nepal was not far 
from interference; it influenced the CMR to address Indian security concerns in Nepal by 
bringing it under India’s security umbrella, which undermined Nepal’s sovereignty, 
challenging the “manifest destiny of the soldiers” to protect their sovereignty and disposing 
them to intervene.65 To begin with, the signing of the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
between Nepal and India had Nepal essentially accede to the demands of an emerging 
regional power of the subcontinent. Article 5 of the treaty confined Nepal to the purchase 
of arms and ammunition either from India or with consultation of India, while Article 8 
cancelled treaties entered into on behalf of India between the British Government and 
Nepal.66 Likewise, the leverage of the Indian political advisor with the king and Indian 
influence over the NC were also conspicuous.67 Finally, the arrival of an Indian military 
mission to modernize the NA in 1952,68 including the presence of Indian military check 
posts along the Nepal-China border, also suggest Indian assertions in Nepal.69 Likewise, 
Prime Minister Nehru’s (1947–1964) concerns over communist China and his public 
remarks of India’s borders being in the Himalayas inside Nepal’s territory also justified 
Indian security concerns in Nepal.70 Similarly, the then Indian ambassador’s clout in 
shaping Nepali government policy was considered notorious even among foreign 
diplomats.71 Collectively, these events shaped the political course to accommodate Indian 
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security concerns at the cost of Nepal having to surrender her sovereignty. Politically, the 
NA was reduced to becoming an auxiliary of the Indian military, guarding Nepal’s frontiers 
in the north.  
“The manifest destiny, the providential mission of the soldiers as saviours [Sic] of 
their countries,” as Finer quoted President Romulo Bétancourt (1959–1964) of Venezuela 
to justify the motives disposing the military to intervene,72 however, did not materialize in 
Nepal. The NA showed no signs of meddling in political power to reverse the decisions of 
the political elites. The Interim Act of 1951, and the popular political will of the country to 
discard the old regime, overshadowed the developments of the Indo-Nepal relations.  
The second attribute concerns the undermining of the “corporate self-interest of the 
armed forces” with the dissolution of the majority of the NA rank and file, including the 
militia, by the Indian military mission in 1952, yet again disposing the NA to intervene.73 
The structural changes made by the Indian military mission to modernize the NA reduced 
its size to only 6,000, while the militia that was established in the 1880s by Nepal was 
scrapped completely.74 The NA did not contest the political decision, which is unexplained 
and absent in historical accounts.  
The two narratives that are available in scholarly literature and news archives that 
explain the purpose for modernizing the NA through the introduction of the Indian military 
mission are not convincing; they are against the notion of “national interest” in Finer’s 
words.75 The first one claims the need to reform Rana traditions in the NA and create a 
new merit-based military hierarchy “capable of formulating basic military policies.”76 This 
narrative, however, was formulated only after Rakshya Dal, a paramilitary force created to 
rehabilitate the military wing of the NC, revolted in 1952, asking for an all-party 
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representation, as one of many demands.77 The NA actually helped to crush the revolt as 
directed by the government. Likewise, in the recent past, NA contingents had taken part in 
World War II and assisted India during the Hyderabad Action with successful 
results.78Therefore, the NA evidently was capable of formulating basic military policies. 
The second narrative points towards India’s fear of Communist China’s incursion into 
Tibet.79 While the fear may have been valid, the results of the NA’s modernization process 
clearly were contrary to a strong and disciplined modern army, since the NA was drastically 
reduced to a mere 6,000 as mentioned earlier. Evidently, the post-Rana regime CMR failed 
to address the corporate self-interest of the NA. 
While it can be argued that the top-ranking Rana military elites were co-opted by 
the new system, which therefore prevented coups, the “strategic logic of military coups” 
according to Naunihal Singh suggests otherwise. The cooption was conspicuous to the 
point that, out of ten ministers in the cabinet, half were Ranas, including the prime minister, 
the defense minister, and the foreign minister, who also used to be generals in the NA 
during the Rana regime. According to Naunihal Singh, however, coups can also be 
coordinated by the middle-ranking and low-ranking officers.80 In fact, the middle-ranking 
officers are those that have control of the fighting units and often use hard power at their 
disposal to coordinate coups.81 By contrast, the coup attempts from the low-ranking 
officers are usually termed as mutinies, and their chances of success are often extremely 
low.82 The transition of power from the Rana regime is devoid of coups as well as mutinies 
from the NA, however, despite glaring attributes that provided “motives disposing the 
military to intervene.”83 The co-option of top Rana elites by the new system in the 
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government partly explains an uncontested dissolution; it does not, however, explain how 
the middle- and low-ranking officers were convinced to retire en-masse. Evidently, against 
Finer’s justification, “the corporate self-interest of the armed forces” being a crucial motive 
disposing the military to intervene,84 did not result in a military intervention in Nepal. 
Perhaps, the knowledge that coup attempts usually fail when staged by middle- and low-
ranking officers, as explained by Naunihal Singh,85 was common knowledge in Nepal. 
Since the coup was never staged, the failure of theory to explain the phenomenon remains 
the only fact. 
Finally, the last attribute concerns political infighting within and among political 
parties that threatened the stability of a fragile nation undergoing transition, pushing it to 
an “overt crisis”—in Finer’s words, a perfect “opportunity to intervene.”86 The 1950s 
political culture of party politics in Nepal was mired in constant competition for leadership, 
particularly within the NC, which exhibited authoritarian trends and nationalistic narratives 
including agitational united front tactics.87 Between 1951 and 1955, the cabinet reshuffled 
five times and included three different prime ministers and a chief councilor.88 The 
agreement primarily related to party politics oriented towards remaining in political power. 
The struggle between Bisheshwar Prasad Koirala and his brother Matrika Prasad Koirala 
for control over the party and the government was conspicuous.89 At the grassroots, the 
discontent was evident. As mentioned earlier, Rakshya Dal had revolted, demanding all 
party representation in the government out of many demands.90 The NA successfully 
crushed the revolt as directed by the government. Likewise, the Union of Low-Grade 
Government Employees, associated with the communist party, crippled the functioning of 
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the government through strikes.91 The nation was clearly in an “overt crisis,” which 
provided the NA “the opportunity to intervene.”92 The NA did not intervene but the 
prevailing circumstance definitely helped to lay the foundation for the next transition of 
power. 
Given the account of the aftermath of the fall of Rana regime, the theories of 
military intervention in politics clearly support the possibilities of the NA taking over the 
political power; yet the NA never staged a coup. By Finer’s standards, “both disposition 
and opportunity to intervene,” result in military interventions.93 As explained earlier—“the 
manifest destiny of the soldiers,” “corporate self-interest of the armed forces,” and 
“national interest” are all motives disposing the military to intervene.94 Likewise, the 
humiliating reduction of the NA in addition to sovereignty issues emanating from Indian 
security concerns in Nepal could easily have enticed the “mood to intervene.”95 The “overt 
crisis” as an “effect of domestic circumstances” stemming from inter- and intra-party 
political wrangling did give the NA “the opportunity to intervene.”96 In the NA’s case, 
however, “the calculus of intervention” of “both disposition and opportunity to intervene” 
did not result in a coup d’état.97  
Similarly, from Perlmutter’s standpoint, social conditions that contribute to 
praetorianism (military intervention in politics) are rooted in “structural weakness or 
disorganization; the existence of fratricidal classes, including a politically impotent middle 
class; and low levels of social action and of mobilization of material resources.”98 The 
social conditions that Perlmutter described were akin to those of the post-Rana regime 
transition of power. The political narrative that drove the movement to overthrow the Rana 
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regime was in fact based on improving such social conditions, but instead the new power 
elite deteriorated the conditions further. While Perlmutter is careful about determining the 
outcome as a result of the presence or absence of these conditions,99 the social conditions 
in Nepal after the demise of the Rana regime evidently did not produce a coup.  
In spite of all the factors that could have produced a coup, however, the NA 
acknowledged the terms of the Government of Nepal Act, 1951, thereby accepting the legal 
leadership of the king as its supreme commander.100 While the new regime’s control over 
the military was achieved to a point of total ineffectiveness, the absence of tangible 
resistance from the military points towards an alternative answer. The legal (Act or a 
Constitution) and widely approved political direction of the country seem to base the NA’s 
dependability upon its organizational role and its future. The trend is visible throughout 
other transitions of power that emerged in the following period. As far as the political 
situation after the demise of the Rana regime is concerned, there is little doubt that the joint 
political efforts of the king and political elites in favor of a sovereign Nepal, to move away 
from Indian intervention, radically shaped the political process for a second transition of 
power including the CMR that was to follow. 
B. POWER TRANSITION II: THE REVIVAL OF ABSOLUTE MONARCHY 
(1960) 
The CMR that ensued with the revival of absolute monarchy presented neither 
disposition nor opportunity for a military intervention, which makes it a standalone case 
among the four power transitions since the 1950s. The revival of absolute monarchy in 
Nepal can be attributed to the post-Rana regime political culture, however, and the 
aspirations of a stable and sovereign Nepal devoid of conspicuous Indian interference. 
These aspirations seem to have converged in the leadership of King Mahendra, who took 
over after King Tribhuwan passed away in 1955. The 1959 constitution of Nepal and the 
first practice of a nationwide election in the history of Nepal were his political innovations. 
The post-election partisan political culture had him do away with the underperforming 
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partisan practice in 1960, however, reviving absolute monarchy. Like the previous 
transition of power, the NA followed the popular political drive and the legal directives of 
the supreme commander, as stipulated by the 1959 constitution. King Mahendra also 
introduced a new and indigenously formulated “guided democracy,” commonly known as 
the Panchayat system, through the introduction of the 1962 constitution, which fortified 
the position of absolute monarchy in Nepal.101 As for the CMR, the Panchayat era 
government practiced firm civilian control over the military focusing on military 
effectiveness; this is evident from the growth in size, budget, roles, and missions and the 
results of military operations the NA undertook, both nationally and internationally.  
The time frame between 1951 and 1955 also witnessed a struggle for power 
between the king and the democratic forces. The king’s push towards moving from an 
interim constitution of 1951 to a more permanent constitution through a constituent 
assembly was opposed by the NC, which demanded an election.102 The struggle for power 
can be credited to the provision of executive authority being vested in the king according 
to Article 22 in the Interim Government of Nepal Act, 1951.103 With the accession of 
Mahendra as the King of Nepal in 1955, however, the political development of Nepal took 
a different turn. His statesmanship gradually overshadowed the leadership of the political 
parties, which assisted in laying the foundation for absolute monarchy.  
In 1959, the long overdue but short-lived multi-party constitution was made public 
by King Mahendra.104 The provision of executive authority being vested in the monarch 
through Articles 10 and 10.5 of the 1959 constitution is often considered as King 
Mahendra’s spin to usurp power.105 Technically, if compared to the consensus-built 
interim act of Nepal, 1951, Article 22 is not that different at all. The additions are Article 
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10.2, which empowers the prime minister and the cabinet, and Article 10.5, which makes 
the king the final decision maker if and when his discretionary decision is required.106 In 
the first election, under the 1959 constitution, NC won a landslide victory with a two-thirds 
majority. The conflict within the party leadership rendered the victory useless, however, as 
the party was deeply divided.107  
By 1960, King Mahendra’s political shrewdness sidelined the ambitions of the NC 
leadership, who were often at loggerheads with each other.108 By contrast, King Mahendra 
was able to forge a wider consensus to steer the country out of the political turbulence that 
was at large. With the help of those against power politics within the NC and from the 
opposition, King Mahendra declared a takeover of the government in December 1960, 
citing lapses in national security, abuse of authority by the elected officials, incitement of 
regionalism and ethnicism by political parties, the resulting threat to peace and sovereignty, 
and dragging the monarchy into party politics.109 The takeover is often labeled a royal 
coup, unlike other Asian countries where Western-style parliamentary institutions were 
being abolished because of non-delivery, but Nepal’s case was different.110 “Probably the 
most important was the relatively minor part played by the military in the royal 
coup….There was no “Young Turk” [Sic] faction in the Nepal state army with pronounced 
political views and ambitions.”111 The NA was simply following the orders of its Supreme 
Commander with the authority vested upon it by Article 64 of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Nepal, 1959.112   
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Two years later, in December 1962, the Panchayat constitution was introduced 
under the aegis of those who broke away from the NC, with some being “architects of 
Mahendra’s party-less panchayat [Sic] system.”113 A wider consensus was also forged by 
King Mahendra to accommodate the communists and those who had nationalistic 
sentiments.114 The opposition party leaders of the previous NC-led government supported 
the move as well.115 Essentially, the Panchayat system was a party-less, four-tiered 
electoral system starting from the village- and town-level assemblies and moving up to the 
district, zone, and ultimately the national-level assembly.116 The 1962 Panchayat 
constitution formalized absolute monarchy and institutionalized the Panchayat system for 
almost three decades. Towards the end of Panchayat system, the growing discontent 
surrounding minimal political participation, mainly of political parties, escalated into a 
wide-scale demonstration throughout the country, ultimately leading to the system’s 
demise. The system lasted until 1990, with King Birendra being the last king of the 
Panchayat regime.  
Nevertheless, for the NA, the Panchayat system achieved firm constitutional 
control of the NA through Article 83, which gave the NA the “Royal” prefix while 
maintaining the king as the supreme commander.117 Article 83A likewise gave the king 
the power to appoint the Commander-in-Chief,118 which naturally led the NA’s leaders to 
submit to the monarch. On the other hand, an increase in recruitment and military 
expenditure can be observed primarily to reinforce the heavily reduced manpower of the 
NA and the increasing participation in the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, 
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during the Panchayat period.119 The system also marked the withdrawal of the Indian 
military check posts from the Nepal-China border, completed in 1970.120 Likewise, in 
1974, a major disarmament campaign against the Tibetan fighters called Khampas using 
Nepali territory to attack Chinese positions was launched by the NA successfully.121 The 
NA’s roles were also widened through its involvement in nature conservation and nominal 
construction duties.122 By 1990, the NA committed to multiple United Nations observer 
missions while contributing contingents in Lebanon and the Sinai peninsula.123 In addition 
to achieving control of the NA, the Panchayat system was also geared towards building an 
effective military. In essence, except for the absence of democracy, Nepal’s CMR was at 
its best, as it incorporated authoritative control without CMR friction, and effectiveness—
a rather modern CMR paradigm.  
From a CMR perspective, the NA remained loyal to its supreme commander and 
maintained its apolitical stance. The NA was content with the responsibilities it was being 
trusted with. Domestically, the NA had successfully disarmed the Khampas, while 
internationally, the NA was promoting Nepal through United Nations peacekeeping 
missions beyond the borders of India and China. A similar effort by the Mongolian military 
is documented in the CMR-related Discovering Peacekeeping as a New Mission: Mongolia 
by Thomas C. Bruneau and Jargalsaikhan Mendee.124 The collective civil-military effort 
to extend Mongolia’s diplomatic reach beyond the borders of Russia and China is 
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reminiscent of Nepal’s continual deployments in peacekeeping operations since 1958.125 
Such international endeavors clearly show that the obligations of a landlocked country 
manifest through its civil-military partnerships. In terms of opportunity and disposition for 
a coup d’état, the only transition of power since 1950 that presented little to no risk of a 
military coup in Nepal was during the Panchayat era.  
C. POWER TRANSITION III: RESTORATION OF MULTIPARTY 
DEMOCRACY (1990) 
The third transition of power that led to the restoration of democracy in Nepal 
features two distinct phases—the first presented a stable CMR, while the other created an 
“overt crisis” of widespread insurgency leading to the NA’s mobilization and an 
opportunity for the NA to intervene.126 The first phase defines the immediate aftermath of 
the promulgation of the 1990 constitution, which brought the NA under firm democratic 
control. It also captures the aspirations of the general public and high hopes for the 
democratic future as well as prosperity of Nepal. Historically, this is also the point where 
the NA stood its ground to prevent being weakened by partisan political interests as it had 
been in the 1950s. The second phase concerns the political instability and events forcing 
the NA into counterinsurgency operations in 2001. This phase also experienced widespread 
“political decay” of the Nepali political culture leading to the failure of the system and the 
beginning of a new political transition.127 The conditions in Nepal at this time were the 
most powerful cue for a military takeover. History repeated itself, however, and the 
military welcomed the power transition without a military coup d’état. 
After almost thirty years of the Panchayat Era, which banned the political parties, 
a popular movement to restore the representation of political parties through a multi-party 
democracy in Nepal emerged, pushing for a democratic transition in the country.128 The 
impact of the “dissolution of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union,” and “the participatory 
 
125 Nepali Army, “The Nepali Army in UN Peace Support Operations.” 
126 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 72–77. 
127 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 4. 
128 Rahim, “Nepal: Government and Politics,” 152. 
30 
experiences of Nepalese in India,” influenced the movement in Nepal as well.129 As a 
result, a new constitution restored multiparty democracy in 1990. Absolute monarchy 
ended, and the king become a constitutional monarch, confined to constitutionally defined 
roles.130 The military was constitutionally brought under firm democratic control and the 
democratic future of Nepal looked very bright. As Michael Hutt notes, “Compared with 
the earlier constitutions of Nepal—particularly with the 1962 dispensation—the 1990 
Constitution represented a dramatic advance in the evolution of a democratic, 
constitutional order in Nepal.”131 Article 118 of the new constitution formed the National 
Defense Council, which would advise the king on matters related to military 
mobilization.132 Widely credited to the NA’s insistence on the constitution 
recommendations commission,133 Article 119 made the king the supreme commander of 
the NA, who was responsible for appointing the commander-in-chief, but only on the 
recommendation of the prime minister.134 Article 68.2 provisioned for the finance bill 
concerning the NA to be introduced as a government bill.135 The new constitution brought 
the military under democratic control of democratically elected officials, and the military 
accepted the terms of the political elites.  
The democratic consolidation presented underlying instabilities, however. The 
political differences between and within various political parties was drastically different 
and could not be bridged. The inter- and intra-party competition was reminiscent of the 
1950s politics before King Mahendra took over. The competition that ensued sidelined a 
faction of the communist bloc of Nepal to the point of armed rebellion. While the Maoists 
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were “adept at destabilizing Nepal’s fledgling civil society,” the national political 
leadership were “incompetent in managing national political stability.”136 On one hand, 
the regular postponing of elections citing threats to security undermined the fundamentals 
of democratic value; on the other, the displacement of political party members and active 
civil society from rural Nepal threatened the democratic consolidation process. The 
impacts of insurgency set back Nepal’s national development by decades and “also 
damaged democratization efforts.”137  
A civil-military struggle between the then prime minister and the military is 
believed to have taken place after the Maoist insurgency took a violent turn in Nepal in 
September 2000, after the Maoists attacked a remote district headquarters of Dolpa.138 
Apparently, Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala wanted to mobilize the NA immediately, 
while Chief of Army Staff Prajjwalla Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana refused to mobilize 
without a wider consensus in the House; King Birendra was equally unwilling to accept 
Nepali casualties in the process.139 The mobilization of the NA required a unanimous 
recommendation from the National Defense Council, which then required the king’s 
approval. The prime minister simply lacked the political consensus in the National Defense 
Council and the parliament that is required to mobilize the NA. 
A different route to mobilize the NA was formulated by the government, however, 
and a well-thought-out military plan also incorporating developmental projects known as 
the Internal Security and Development Project (ISDP) “was unveiled in August 2001” by 
the government.140 Therefore, the NA’s first deployment was to support the national 
counterinsurgency measures to support the ISDP. The plan derailed after the Maoists 
attacked an NA facility at a place called Dang, in November 2001, which forced the NA’s 
direct involvement in offensive counterinsurgency operations. The incident produced a 
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wider political consensus against the Maoists, leading to the enactment of a state of 
emergency, through the constitutional proclamation of the king (King Gyanendra in this 
case).141 From this point on, the military employment in the counterinsurgency campaign 
in Nepal became a regular feature.  
The military had an opportunity to intervene. The general discontent in the domestic 
politics and the continual delay in elections in the guise of extending the state of emergency 
to counter widespread insurgency led to a constitutional crisis.142 Likewise, the military 
was overstretched and bore the brunt of the insurgency. By Desch’s logic, “a state facing 
low external and high internal threats should experience the weakest civilian control of the 
military.”143 Often dubbed a coup,144 in February 2005, King Gyanendra’s effort to 
resolve the constitutional crisis by forming an interim government to hold elections using 
Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution had no support of the political parties.145 
In an event reminiscent of the 1950s, the seven major political parties and the 
Maoists sided against the king in a deal brokered by India, widely known as the Twelve 
Point Agreement, signed in November, 2005.146 Once again, the internal politics had taken 
a dangerous turn. The situation in Nepal for Desch would be phenomenon of the third 
world, where civilian control of the military is uncertain and the military intervention in 
politics is regular.147 The NA, however, continued to follow its constitutional duties 
instead. 
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Notwithstanding the nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, which was at its 
peak, the NA’s role in various developmental projects, especially in opening tracks in 
otherwise inaccessible areas and nature conservation, continued.148 Similarly, the NA’s 
engagement in United Nations peacekeeping mission increased dramatically. Between 
1990 and 2005, Nepal committed to twenty-three different missions in various forms.149 
Therefore, a steep spike both in the NA’s recruitment and defense expenditure is also 
conspicuous during this time frame.150 They were not just related to counterinsurgency 
obligations of the NA, however. The NA was simultaneously fulfilling other obligations 
required of it by the state.  
The Twelve Point Agreement, signed between the political parties and the Maoists 
in India in November 2005, became the turning point for the demise of the 1990 
constitution.151 It was also the precursor for ending the constitutional monarchy in Nepal. 
A stark reminder of Indian mediation is recorded in a press conference of the Maoist leaders 
held at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, documented in Associated Press 
archives.152 The political developments had drastically but quietly shifted in favor of the 
Maoist Communists. The agitation on the streets in conjunction with heightened Maoist 
attacks was becoming untenable to the government. Despite ample opportunities to 
intervene, however, the military simply kept its hands-off politics once again. The next 
transition of power was just over the horizon. 
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D. POWER TRANSITION IV: THE DECLARATION OF A FEDERAL
REPUBLIC (2006)
The tables had turned for the monarchy in Nepal. The alliance of the major political
parties took to protesting the king’s move of using Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution, in 
February 2005, demanding restoration of the dissolved parliament. On the other hand, the 
Maoists unilaterally broke ceasefire and increased their offensive. The timeline of the 
Maoist offensive in 2006, captured in the South Asia Terrorism Portal, gives an account of 
the intensity of violence the government faced during the time.153 The combined effects 
of demonstrations on the streets and nationwide armed attacks took their toll on the state’s 
functioning. Likewise, the alliance of the major political parties refused to take part in the 
elections announced by the government.154 A marginal twenty percent turnout to vote 
demonstrated the fear in the general public.155 The U.S. ambassador to Nepal James 
Moriarty’s plea to the king and the political parties to unite against the Maoists did not 
materialize.156 The alliance had been formed elsewhere through the signing of the Twelve 
Point Agreement. The king eventually reinstated the dissolved parliament on 24 April 
2006.  
The events after the signing of the November 2005 Twelve Point Agreement 
between the Maoists and the alliance of major political parties had three distinct phases. In 
the first phase, the effort of the alliance was towards laying the political groundwork to 
dismember the monarch’s political power. The second phase was geared towards managing 
the Maoist combatants. Finally, the most important of all, the final phase had the alliance 
cement the achievements of the previous parts, by formally institutionalizing the gains by 
promulgating a new constitution.  
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Following the reinstatement of the parliament in April 2006, the peace accord 
between the government and the Maoists was signed on 22 November the same year. This 
event marked the political entry of the Maoists in mainstream politics and later their entry 
into the interim legislature.157 While the legality and minimal national consensus of the 
process is highly controversial, the interim constitution of 2007, through a series of 
amendments, scrapped the monarchy, declared Nepal a federal democratic republic, and 
got rid of the Hindu status of the country. The prospect of peace by bringing the Maoists 
into mainstream politics overshadowed all the agendas.158 While King Gyanendra left the 
palace, many anticipated a possible stand from the NA against the government’s move, but 
the NA showed no signs of loyalty to the king. The groundwork to dismember the king’s 
political influence of any form or shape had been laid.  
Before the constituent assembly elections could be held to promulgate a new 
constitution, sufficient confidence between the armed Maoists and the leading political 
parties had to be built. Therefore, the management of the Maoist combatants was a 
precondition prescribed in the comprehensive peace accord by the signatories.159 The 
United Nations was officially brought in for both tasks. The Maoist combatants were to 
remain within the designated temporary cantonments while the United Nations was to 
verify the eligibility of the combatants for the integration process. Meanwhile, the Maoists’ 
weapons were to be stored under UN supervision, and a similar number of weapons 
belonging to the NA were to be stored in NA barracks, also under UN supervision. The 
NA in due time were to be confined to the barracks and a new Army Act, 2063, was to be 
implemented by the interim government. The NA welcomed the decision and complied 
without resistance. With the preconditions for constituent assembly elections achieved, a 
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nationwide election was held on 10 April 2008. The Maoists won a landslide victory, and 
Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal assumed the post of the prime minister.160    
The most prominent and conspicuous CMR feud ever to take place in Nepal 
developed immediately after the Maoist leader took office. The feud was primarily over a 
regular recruitment process of the NA that the Maoist party chairman and the prime 
minister contested. When the NA continued the process that had already begun, the prime 
minister attempted to sack Chief of Army Staff Rukmangad Katwal, an effort that was 
ultimately revoked by President Ram Baran Yadav. As a result, the Chief of Army Staff 
remained whereas Pushpa Kamal Dahal resigned after less than nine months in office.161 
The decision was widely debated in the political circle, but in retrospect, a wider consensus 
that the Maoists were trying to politically influence and intimidate the national army was 
held by non-Maoist parties including the president. Moreover, the provision in the interim 
constitution were vague as far as the removal of the army chief was concerned. Hence, the 
constitutionality of the decision from both the prime minister and the president was not 
absolutely certain.  
For the NA, the events leading to the promulgation of the new constitution were 
the most challenging in terms of maintaining harmonious CMR. For the most part, common 
also to previous transitions of power, the succeeding power wanted to dislodge the NA’s 
loyalty to the vanquished power, and in this case it was the monarchy. Second, the NA was 
mindful of the fact that circumstances were similar to those of the 1950s. As evidence, the 
possible effort to tamper with the NA’s cohesion was expressed by the Maoist leader 
himself, through his interview of November 2006, which is now available for public 
viewing.162 In fact, a CMR fiasco did occur leading to the sacking of the Chief of Army 
Staff. Similarly, issues of historical and cultural sentiments of the majority of the 
population, particularly the issue of religion and ethnicity, were being decided by the 
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interim government through amendments to the interim constitution that lacked wider 
consensus. The NA had plenty of opportunities and possible disposition to intervene. 
Nonetheless, the trend continued, and the NA defied the theories of military intervention 
in politics.  
Taking into account Naunihal Singh’s practical approach of considering “Coups as 
coordination game,” the Nepali CMR at the time, theoretically, could have easily resulted 
in a very successful coup by the NA.163 Particularly so, because Singh’s logic does not 
necessarily endorse the military’s political beliefs as an important factor during coup 
attempts.164 According to him, “If the strategic logic of a coup attempt is one of 
coordination, then we would expect a coup to be won by the side that is best at manipulating 
information and expectations, which is not necessarily the side with the most brute force 
or popularity.”165 In this event, the army chief had the informational advantage and also 
the necessary brute force and the popularity, which though not required by theory, could 
still have resulted in a successful coup. Yet the military did not resort to praetorian behavior 
and instead followed the constitutional provision and the political elites.  
Following the end of this CMR fiasco, the government aimed to promulgate a new 
constitution by the stipulated timeframe. Failing to do so, the declaration of a second round 
of constituent assembly election was announced, which was held in 2013. By then the NA 
had become a trusted entity of the government. The NA assisted the government to provide 
a secure environment for the second constituent assembly elections. As a result, the elected 
constituent assembly eventually promulgated a new constitution in 2015. Article 266 
established the National Defense Council for making recommendations for the 
mobilization of the NA to the executive.166 The power of the supreme commander is vested 
in the President and the provisions to accommodate principles of equality and inclusion in 
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recruitment is included in the constitution.167 The 2015 constitution also authorizes the 
Public Commission Service to conduct a written examination of any potential army officer. 
The role of the NA is constitutionally widened for participation in developmental purposes, 
disaster management, and loosely framed “others” or other purposes through Article 
267.168 The transition of power was institutionalized formally, and the NA largely assisted 
the process without a coup. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Contradicting the theories of military intervention in politics, the transitions of 
power in Nepal since the 1950s were devoid of military coups. In terms of relative 
comparison of the CMR in Nepal since the 1950s, the Panchayat system presented an 
exceptionally stable CMR, the one without a civil-military conflict. The absence of 
democracy during this period clearly spelled firm political control being vested in the king. 
Nonetheless, the Panchayat system steered the NA into being functionally effective, and it 
proved to stay well within the military circle. No wonder, the sheer absence of civil-
military struggle is a testament to this case. Likewise, the initial stage of the promulgation 
of the 1990 constitution was a better format without a doubt. This time around, the 
democratic control was achieved while the NA’s cohesion was not disturbed. These two 
cases in particular are exceptional in the larger power transition dynamics of Nepal where 
the theoretical conditions required for a military coup d’état, or praetorianism, do not 
necessarily apply.  
Nonetheless, the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Rana regime and immediate 
pre- and post-insurgency Nepal present disposition and opportunities for military 
intervention in politics. Clear evidence links the political developments during these 
timeframes to theoretical preconditions required for praetorianism. Finer’s disposition and 
opportunity to intervene, or Perlmutter’s social conditions contributing to praetorianism, 
or even Desch’s logic of internal disturbance contributing to frequent military interventions 
as a third world phenomenon are glaring in Nepal’s political development. Similarly, 
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Naunihal Singh’s coordination game theory could easily be applied to the NA pulling off 
a successful coup.  
Instead, a clear pattern of following legal constitutional arrangements regarding the 
NA, by the NA, during and after each power transition is evident. The cases presented 
clearly show that the NA has neither presented itself as an obstruction to change or 
transition of power nor taken advantage of the situation to grab power. The few accounts 
of CMR tensions are mostly legal and have not been about military takeovers. This 
character of the NA therefore presents a dichotomy between the conditions present in Nepal 
and the trend in the behavior of the military as far as military intervention leading to coup 
d’états are concerned.  
  
40 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  
41 
III. THE NEPALI ARMY AND THE NEPALI STATE 
One possible explanation of the dichotomy between the NA’s behavior of 
circumventing coups and the existence of favorable conditions for a coup d’état in Nepal 
during political transitions since the 1950s is the longstanding neutral character of the NA. 
This relationship is that of an enabler of Nepali statehood as opposed to usurper of political 
power, which emanates from the NA’s history. The very formation of the NA is in fact 
intertwined with the unification of Nepal and Nepali statehood.169 The historical accounts 
of the NA and the unification of Nepal are preserved and celebrated at the grassroots 
through cultural ceremonies that are as much alive as when they began. Therefore, the 
neutral character of the NA is derived from the implicit acceptance of the will of the people, 
which the NA expresses by adhering to legal provisions. This adherence is critical to its 
political relationship with the state, which in turn circumvents coups. 
The neutral character of the NA is manifested in many ways: through activities that 
highlight boundaries embedded in them, that prevent coups from happening, particularly 
during transitions of power. Though the immediate aftermath of political transitions began 
with a tense CMR, over time, the succeeding powers have tended to increase the scope of 
the NA’s missions and roles. The NA’s role in assisting the peaceful transition of political 
power since the 1950s is one of the key activities that explains the absence of coups. 
Regimes’ post-transition reliance on the military is evidence of this relationship. This has 
been the case since the 1950s regardless of the political philosophies of the ruling elites. 
The same is true of the NA’s role in promoting Nepal in the international arena through 
peacekeeping missions that resonate with Nepal’s national political interest of projecting 
commitment to international peace and multilateralism.  
As illustrated in the following sections, the historical legacy of the NA is crucial to 
how the NA’s roles have evolved over time and over transitions. While the NA’s neutrality 
facilitates it to stand as a neutral security apparatus of the Nepali state, the same function 
also allows for a peaceful transition of highly unstable political transitions. This trend is 
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noticeably uniform throughout political transitions in Nepal since the 1950s. As a result, 
we find the NA’s role expanding over time, irrespective of political philosophies brought 
about by the transition of political power. Similarly, Nepal’s commitment to international 
peace and security, being projected through the NA, is a continuation of policy. 
Remarkably, these activities have remained alike, during and after political transitions of 
Nepal since the 1950s. In essence, the NA’s political relationship with the state is based on 
its neutrality, evident from the activities the NA has been increasingly involved in, in every 
transition of power since the 1950s, that automatically circumvents coups. 
A. HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE NEUTRAL CHARACTER OF 
THE NEPALI ARMY  
Historical contribution of the NA in the nation-building process shaped its 
interaction with other institutions in the state. The NA deliberately maintains its historical 
contribution through contemporary projects that highlight unification of Nepal.170 The 
NA’s image as a key contributor to the formation of the Nepali nation-state has been vital 
to the NA’s existence, especially during power transitions since the 1950s. Historically, the 
sole purpose of establishing the NA in 1744, by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, was to form a 
common nation by unifying multiple petty kingdoms, against the threat of rising British 
control over the Indian sub-continent.171 The same purpose is embedded in the NA’s 
neutral character as a unifier, as opposed to a politically inclined military, having partisan 
preferences.  
In The Formation of the Concept of Nation-State in Nepal, Richard Burghart 
explains the evolution of a Nepali nation-state, which according to him was an alien 
concept in the governmental discourse until the Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816).172 He 
acknowledges, however, the fact that “the formation of this concept also occurred in an 
intracultural context that cannot be separated analytically from Nepal’s intercultural field 
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of relations.”173 By intracultural and intercultural, he is referring to the pre- and post-
Anglo-Nepal War diplomatic exchanges between Nepal and the British East India 
Company where alien concepts of a nation-state were being understood by substituting it 
with indigenous notions and terminologies.174 Particularly, the concept of defined 
boundary being a prerequisite of a nation-state became a contentious issue for the Nepali 
authorities, which eventually led to the Anglo-Nepal War, which had the NA at the 
forefront.  
While the concept of a nation-state may have been alien to Nepal, the NA’s role in 
unifying Nepal and protecting her sovereignty from British incursion is a historical fact 
that is relevant to the NA’s institutional cohesion, even today. Evidently, the need for an 
army and a unified nation to counter the impending threat of the British had already been 
identified by King Prithvi Narayan Shah. “One day that force will come”175 is his bold 
description of the British military might and a warning to his successors through Dibya 
Upadesh, or his instructions, disseminated in 1774.176 Along with the anticipation of 
impending British aggression, the Dibya Upadesh also had instructions on how to 
strengthen the military, and the modus-operandi to be incorporated if and when attacked 
by foreign aggressors.177 The legacy of unification started by King Prithvi Narayan Shah 
continued even after his death in 1775.178 It technically ended after the culmination of the 
Anglo-Nepal War (1814–1816), resulting in the Treaty of Sugauli (1816) that dictated 
Nepal’s current boundaries.179 Along with the NA’s role in unifying Nepal and protecting 
her sovereignty, the teachings of King Prithvi Narayan Shah are equally important to the 
 
173 Burghart, 102. 
174 Burghart, 115. 
175 Ludwig F. Stiller, Prithwinarayan Shah in the Light of Dibya Upadesh (Ranchi, Bihar, India: The 
Catholic Press, 1968), 42. 
176 Stiller, 38. 
177 Stiller, 65–69. 
178 Stiller, 37. 
179 BBC News, “Nepal Profile - Timeline.” 
44 
NA. Evidently, as a reminder, the newly built NA headquarters in Kathmandu also features 
a newly built statue of King Prithvi Narayan Shah.180 
Likewise, the NA’s contribution to the nation-building process are widely approved 
at the grassroots and celebrated through unique cultural practices all across Nepal. These 
cultural festivals require the NA’s compulsory participation by ritual. These ceremonies 
are a large part of local communities and are celebrated as a joint venture between the NA 
and the locals throughout Nepal. For instance, it is customary for the NA to participate in 
a major festival called Indra Jatra in Kathmandu Valley.181 While the festival used to be 
celebrated even before Kathmandu was unified by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the festival 
also marks the day he attacked Kathmandu in 1768, as part of the unification campaign.182 
Militarily, the victory over Kathmandu Valley was pivotal to the overall unification 
campaign. Similarly, a remote town in Khalanga, Jumla celebrates a ceremony by 
swapping old flag poles made out of whole tree trunks with new ones. The tree trunks are 
cut, dragged, and stood up jointly by the NA and the local community.183 Apparently, one 
of the tree trunks represents offering made by Bahdur Shah, King Prithvi Narayan Shah’s 
son, who captured Jumla during the unification campaign. Last but not least, is Bhagwati 
Jatra, celebrated in Palpa district.184 The festival marks the victory of the NA over the 
British in the battle of Jitgadh, and it is customary for the local NA unit and its commander 
to participate. Finally, the Army Day ceremony is celebrated in Shivaratri, which is a 
common festival celebrated throughout Nepal.185  
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These contributions reinforce the NA’s supportive character at the grassroots, as 
well as in the confidence of the political elites; evident through the activities the NA has 
been increasingly entrusted with, regardless of multiple political transitions since the 
1950s. Paradoxically, the “increased civilian dependence on the military” that results in 
military intervention in politics, according to Finer, fails to be true in Nepal’s case because 
of the NA’s neutrality.186 Likewise, the activities with which the state therefore entrusts 
the NA on one hand implicitly set the boundaries for the NA to uphold and on the other 
benefit that NA. Collectively, these benefits and boundaries force the NA to remain outside 
of politics as an institution.  
Since the 1950s, as a boundary, the NA has accepted the popular will of the people 
backed by legal provisions during each transition of power, eventually allowing the NA to 
assist political transitions later on. Likewise, the increasing roles and missions of the NA 
since the 1950s have been a result of the NA bearing a neutral character; justifying the 
NA’s utility during peacetime, keeping the NA’s role current and relevant. Similarly, as 
the NA engages in UN peacekeeping operations, it helps foster Nepal’s international 
profile, but it also helps the NA’s institutional wellbeing, thereby disincentivizing 
possibilities of military interventions. Therefore, the political relationship of the NA with 
the state is based on the neutral character of the NA, which adheres to boundaries derived 
from the popular will and current legal provisions, consequently also benefiting the NA 
and preventing coups.  
B. THE NEPALI ARMY AS ENABLER TO POLITICAL TRANSITION 
Since the 1950s, the NA’s political relationship with the state has allowed the 
political elites to find utility in the NA’s neutrality and the ability to render security services 
to assist in the peaceful transition of political power, fueled by the will of the people, and 
new legal provisions, thereby circumventing possibilities of a coups d’état. Since the 
1950s, the NA’s assistance to power transitions as a result of a wide political consensus 
has had a significant impact on keeping the political agreements on track. Evidently, 
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dealing with armed rebellion of Rakshya Dal in 1952, the NA’s counterinsurgency 
operations of the early 2000s, security during elections in 1990s, including during 
constituent assembly elections of the post-2006 transition, are examples of such assistance. 
Therefore, the NA’s role has been largely complementary to the outcome of political 
changes in Nepal. While the neutrality of the NA may have served as the coup preventing 
ingredient, it also served to create newfound political trust between the NA and the new 
civilian masters, eventually establishing a CMR without coups during transitions. 
The CMR geared towards assisting the political transition is conspicuous since the 
1950s. In the immediate aftermath of the post-Rana regime in 1951, the new political 
challenge would have been to disarm and demobilize the armed faction of the Nepali 
Congress called Mukti Sena. While there is speculative analysis that the NA was reluctant 
to provide the paramilitary force Rakshya Dal with weapons, the evidence prove that the 
NA did provide one thousand rifles to Rakshya Dal as asked of it by the government.187 
Likewise, when the Rakshya Dal revolted in 1952, threatening the peaceful transition, the 
NA, as asked by the government, put the revolt down.188 The post-Rana regime case is 
evident of the fact that the NA’s actions were meant to support the peaceful transition of 
power as opposed to exploiting the opportunities of military intervention. Likewise, 
regardless of the fact that the NA’s size was to be reduced, the NA accepted the terms of 
military reforms of 1952, which broadened the ethnic and social base of the officer 
corps.189  
It is evident that the Panchayat era ensured a strong civilian control over the 
military, with particular attention to “emasculate the military as a potent political force—
and with considerable success.”190 The NA remained loyal to the political direction of the 
new system, however. During the Panchayat era, the NA’s role in disarming the Khampas, 
as asked of it by the government, was effectively conducted.191 Similarly, national 
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aspirations for better international relations through military deployments in peacekeeping 
missions, which began during Panchayat era, were professionally carried out by the NA. 
In fact, the trend continues until today. 
In the aftermath of the 1990 political transition, Nepal was troubled by the Maoist 
insurgency that spread across the nation and severely challenged the gains of the 1990 
power transition. With the establishment of the National Defense Council, the control of 
the military was vested in the council through Article 118 of the 1990 constitution.192 The 
lack of unanimity and political consensus in the National Defense Council and the 
parliament hindered military mobilization initially, the NA eventually mobilized for 
counterinsurgency operations. The NA first mobilized as a security element in a much more 
comprehensive Internal Security and Development Project (ISDP) in 2001.193 Likewise, 
the newly built Armed Police Force (APF) was trained and equipped by the NA on 
directions of the government.194 After Maoists attacked Dang barracks in November 2001, 
the NA mobilized for offensive counterinsurgency operations.  
The transition that made Nepal a secular federal democratic republic equally has 
the NA’s share to claim as far as peaceful transition of power is concerned. Amidst fear 
and mistrust in the Maoists regarding the NA’s loyalty, the Maoists were reluctant to 
simply lay down arms. Through the Comprehensive Peace Accord of 2006, the leading 
political parties agreed to manage the arms and armies of the Maoists and the NA with the 
help of the United Nations.195 Though it was symbolic for the NA to lock down equal 
number of arms in containers to match the number of weapons belonging to the Maoists, 
the NA’s gesture was done in good faith. The NA loyally followed the directives of the 
government. Likewise, verified Maoist combatants who were qualified to join the NA were 
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systematically absorbed into the ranks and file of the NA.196 Moreover, for the second 
round of constituent assembly elections, as directed by the government, the NA eagerly 
planned for and provided security during the elections.197  
The neutral character of the NA is important to its actions, which are governed by 
legal parameters instead of political interests. Regardless of political principles of the 
political elites, the NA since the 1950s has consistently assisted political transition of 
power through legal and constitutional provisions. In retrospect it is evident that the NA’s 
behavior to the peaceful settlement of power transitions has been uniform and 
complementary to the state’s requirements of the time. Hence, assisting transition of power 
directed through legal and constitutional provisions has preserved the NA’s neutrality, 
keeping it away from power competition.  
C. THE NEPALI ARMY AS A POLITICAL SOLUTION  
The NA’s neutral character has been equally important in establishing the NA as a 
reliable solution to politically charged problems, regardless of the post-transition political 
philosophies of the political elites, making the NA a relevant force with utility for political 
leaders even in peace, which naturally circumvents coups. The positive relationship 
between the NA and the post-transition political elites, emanating from increased civilian 
dependence on the NA contributes to the prevention of military interest in political power. 
By contrast, Finer points out that “Increased civilian dependence on the military” gives 
military the opportunity to intervene.198 The NA’s neutral standpoint forces the NA to 
follow directions prescribed by legal and constitutional provisions, however, even though 
they are politically polarized. The NA’s inherent resourcefulness, expertise, and neutral 
stance allow it to stand as an alternative to otherwise politically divided solutions—partisan 
interest groups and partisan contractors. Therefore, as a trend, the post-transition 
constitutions have brought the military firmly under civilian control, but simultaneously, 
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the post-transition conduct of the political elites since the 1950s reveals an increasing 
dependence on the military. This dependence in turn has resulted in more resources for the 
military, bolstering its strength and capability. The results clearly exhibit a shift in the 
intent of new political leadership from controlling the military to using military expertise 
as a solution for political problems.  
Since the 50s, the roles and missions including the size and expenditure of the NA 
have increased. While the roles of the NA are not explicitly defined in the Government of 
Nepal Act, 1948 and 1951 including the constitutions of 1959, 1962, and 1990, the spike 
in the size and military expenditure of the NA according to World Bank data can be noticed 
since the Panchayat era.199 Likewise, since 1975 the NA has also been in environmental 
security.200 Currently more than six thousand NA troops are involved in nature 
conservation roles across twelve conservation areas.201 The NA also engages in 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) duties. Disregarding minor 
incidents, the most current full-fledged employment of the NA for disaster management 
purposes was in 2015, when an earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter Scale devastated 
Nepal. Operation Sankat Mochan was officially launched to manage the effects of the 
earthquake with nationwide NA deployments.202 Likewise, infrastructure development is 
another area where the NA has constantly been employed since the Panchayat era.203  
Unlike the older constitutions, the 2015 Constitution is rather explicit in what it 
wants the army to do. According to Article 267.1 the role of the NA is to protect “Nepal’s 
independence, Sovereignty, territorial integrity, autonomy and national unity.”204 
Similarly, Article 267.4 specifies that the “Government of Nepal may, in accordance with 
Federal Law, mobilize Nepal Army for works relating to development, disaster 
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management and others.”205 While the word “others” in Article 267.4 may be ambiguous, 
the NA, since Nepal became a federal democratic republic, has been mobilized for a 
multitude of tasks including providing security in elections and undertaking mega-scale 
construction projects.206 Lately, the NA has been employed also to procure medical 
equipment required to counter the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)207 as well as 
assisting the government’s larger effort to counter COVID-19.208 Likewise, the incumbent 
Defense Minister Ishwor Pokhrel’s interview also clarifies the political intent to use the 
national asset in times of dire needs.209 
While there is plenty of opposition to projects that involve the NA, most of the 
projects were awarded to the NA as a result of politically charged struggle between the 
incumbent and various interest groups. For instance, putting down the rebellion of 
Rakshyall Dal in 1952 required a non-partisan security entity to crush the force that was 
essentially formed to rehabilitate the armed cadres of the NC. The NA stood up as a neutral 
solution to the political problem and crushed the rebellion. Likewise, employing the NA in 
the 1991 parliamentary elections210 is another example of the NA’s neutral status being 
useful in a multiparty competition. Similarly, the NA’s role in assisting the post-2006 
peace-process—integration of the Maoist combatants in the NA and providing security 
during the second constituent assembly elections—is no different.211 The most recent 
examples of the NA standing as an neutral solution to politically charged problems are that 
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of the Kathmandu-Terrai fast-track project and the procurement of medical supplies by the 
NA for COVID-19 response.212 The government was under pressure by various interest 
groups to award the contract to competitors, which would have resulted in the government 
losing tax payer’s money. Eventually, the NA the neutral entity and stood as an alternative 
agency that could deliver the results. Such employment of the national military, however, 
has embroiled the NA in corruption allegations and at times has become counterproductive 
to the NA’s image.213 Nevertheless, the NA stands as an alternative solution to politically 
charged problems as a result of its neutral character.  
The positive political relationship built on the state’s reliance on the military based 
on the NA’s neutrality, therefore averts possibilities of military intervention in politics, as 
it keeps the NA relevant in peacetime and finds military utility. In essence, the neutral 
character of the NA keeps it relevant to the demands of the political elites, as long as it 
satisfies the legal limits entrusted upon them, by the legal contract also endorsed by the 
people. Therefore, finding utility in otherwise non-military roles and tasks is a political 
solution for the political elites; but for the NA, finding its utility in such roles and tasks 
also makes it a relevant force reinforcing its existence, therefore circumventing coups as a 
trend since the 1950s.  
D. THE NEPALI ARMY AND UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
MISSIONS   
The NA’s participation in UN peacekeeping missions is an important feature of the 
NA’s political relationship with the state; it actively promotes Nepal’s international 
aspirations on one hand, and on the other, it assists the NA’s institutional well-being and 
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keeps the NA from intervening in politics. The NA’s role in implementing Nepal’s foreign 
policy through participation in UN peacekeeping missions resonates with the principles of 
conforming to world peace and multilateralism. “Successive Nepali governments viewed 
the regular contribution to the UN missions as a contribution to good international 
citizenship and a way to raise Nepal’s international profile.”214 At the domestic front, a 
common view of the political elites and the military towards participation in UN 
peacekeeping missions also ensure a good CMR, since both benefit from it. Likewise, 
remittances from participating in UN peacekeeping missions “assist not only individual 
soldiers, but also the Nepal Army welfare program,” which includes “medical, educational 
facilities and humanitarian support to veterans and their families.”215 Similarly, exposing 
the NA’s rank and file to “the complex operational environments of modern peacekeeping” 
also provide “opportunities for professional development.”216 Therefore, the NA’s neutral 
image is equally important to Nepal’s foreign policy aspirations as well as the NA’s 
institutional wellbeing, which complements the NA’s coup-averting behavior.  
Since the acceptance of Nepal’s membership in the UN in 1955, the Nepali political 
elites have had a common perspective of building a positive international profile committed 
to peace and multilateralism. Representing Nepal for the first time, the then Foreign 
Minister Chuda Prashad Sharma’s (1956–1957) speech at the eleventh session of the UN 
General Assembly in 1956 clearly states the expansion of Nepal’s friendship and goodwill 
with all states.217 More pronounced remarks were made by the leader of the Nepali 
delegation Surya Prasad Upadhyay during the 820th plenary meeting of the fourteenth 
session of the UN General Assembly in 1959. Referring to peacekeeping efforts of the 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and Nepal’s participation for the first time in 
United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958, he stated that, “It has been 
amply proved by our experience that a small but efficient United Nations force will be 
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necessary on a permanent basis if the United Nations is to fulfill its great responsibility of 
keeping peace in the world.”218 The most recent remarks of the incumbent Foreign 
Minister Pradeep Kumar Gyawali (2018–present) at the seventy-fourth session of the UN 
General Assembly reiterates Nepal’s commitment to “dedicated, reliable and professional 
services to United Nations peace operations for more than six decades.”219 Regardless of 
changes in the political system, here we can evidently observe the continuation of foreign 
policy principles of world peace and multilateralism based on the UN charter being adhered 
to in Nepal.220 
The NA accordingly has judiciously professionalized its peacekeeping capabilities 
and institutional wellbeing through decades of participation in UN peacekeeping missions. 
Beginning in 1958, a modest deployment of only five military observers to UNOGIL has 
expanded to over 1,32,524 participants covering 43 different UN missions by 2020, with 
current UN deployment figures reaching 5,124, as of August 2020.221 The deployments 
range from providing leadership positions and staffs in Force Headquarters, observers and 
contingents including those with niche capabilities—Special Forces, medical teams, and 
engineers.222 Institutionally by 1986, the NA had established an ad hoc peace operations 
training center.223 Currently the center, commonly known as Birendra Peace Operations 
Training Center (BPOTC) is a UN-accredited state of the art training facility that boasts 
quality pre-deployment trainings and hosts multi-national training events often conducted 
in cooperation with the United States government’s Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) and United States Pacific Command, now the United States Indo-Pacific Command 
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(USINDOPACOM).224 On the welfare front, the remittance earned from peacekeeping 
missions have enabled the NA to generate significant funds, commonly known as the Army 
Welfare Fund, to legally address the welfare of the serving and retired NA members and 
their families.225 Various NA-run educational institutes, hospitals, and welfare programs 
are managed by the Army Welfare Fund.  
Evidently, the UN peacekeeping missions have a multidimensional advantage that 
glues together the political elites and the NA, regardless of the political philosophy that 
guides those in power. A constant foreign policy approach concerning UN peacekeeping 
missions is therefore conspicuous in all transitions of power since 1950s. A political rift 
with regards to UN peacekeeping missions therefore would be counterproductive, not just 
to Nepal’s foreign policy aspirations but also to the institutional wellbeing of the NA. A 
coup d’état on the NA’s part would easily jeopardize Nepal’s standing in international 
relations as well as the advantages the NA gains from the UN peacekeeping missions. As 
a result, the neutrality of the NA allows the political elites to find utility in UN 
peacekeeping missions as a tool of foreign policy and is an important factor that forces the 
NA to circumvent coups. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The political relationship of the NA with the state is complementary, progressive, 
and widely approved at the grassroots. They are crucial to the NA’s existence as a cohesive 
and a neutral force, often at odds with CMR theories of military intervention in politics. 
Yet, these relationships and the resulting activities maintain the balance required in a CMR 
without military intervention in politics. Collectively, these relationships define the NA’s 
character and purpose, which compel the NA to repeatedly circumvent coups, particularly 
during power transitions. The political relationship between the NA and the state shaped 
by the NA’s neutrality may be the driving factor for the NA repeatedly circumventing 
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coups. The intricacies of implicit boundaries of popular will of the people and the NA 
finding relevance in peacetime, however, including legal bounds as a result of political 
transitions, and the institutional wellbeing of the NA equally contribute to the NA’s non-
intervening character. These relationships are also important, when it comes to the NA’s 
unbroken history since 1744, despite various political upheavals, especially after the 1950s, 
and regardless of those political philosophies.  
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IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF THE NEPALI 
ARMY 
 Considering the constant political turbulence and power transitions that have 
characterized the political setting in Nepal since the 1950s, the NA has illustrated a 
commitment to preserving itself as an institution that has contributed to the coup-less 
political transitions in Nepal. Despite the opportunity and disposition to intervene, the 
leadership of the NA at different times since the 1950s has promoted non-interference in 
politics. Therefore, with the exception of the military modernization of 1952, the NA has 
survived every transition of power without facing an extensive reorganization by the 
civilian authorities.  
Finer’s concept of opportunity and the disposition to intervene, vis-à-vis Nepal, 
have been discussed at length in Chapter II. What remains to be explained is the mood of 
the organization and its leadership, however, manifested through various tiers within the 
organization, in transitions of power. Naunihal Singh describes the three tiers of coup 
initiators within the military organization—the top, the middle, and the bottom—arguing 
that the top tier of any military institution has the greatest chance of pulling off a successful 
coup, while the chances of success shrink (i.e., when the coup is instigated by the lower 
tiers).226 As witnessed in Nepal, the middle- and low-ranking officers of the NA have 
never attempted to stage a coup; instead, the instances of CMR tensions in Nepal have been 
limited to the top leadership of the NA. Despite the possibilities of producing a successful 
coup, the decisions of the NA top tier, particularly during the 1990 and post-2006 CMR 
tensions, present a pattern of acceptance of change.  
As described in the following sections, during CMR tensions in 1990 and the post-
2006 transition, the NA leadership maintained cohesion and institutional integrity of the 
NA by not interfering in transitions. These decisions were institutionally driven by the self-
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preservation instinct of the NA, as opposed to being individual decisions of the leaders, 
which will be illustrated below. As a result, the NA survived the tumultuous political power 
transitions that have perpetuated changes in the political landscape of Nepal, with differing 
impacts on the NA as an organization. These impacts have influenced the NA’s sense of 
institutional obligation to preserve its organizational integrity and cohesion, which has 
contributed to the coup-averse behavior of the NA.  
A. ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT OF CHANGING CMR AND DECISIONS 
OF THE NEPALI ARMY 
The transitions of 1990 and 2006 witnessed significant CMR tensions in Nepal and 
demonstrated the NA’s institutional self-preservation instincts. The tension in 1990 
concerned the future of the NA as expressed in the new constitution, as it was being 
drafted.227 Further CMR tension ensued following the 2006 transition, when the decision 
of the prime minister to sack the chief of the NA was revoked by the president.228 What is 
noticeable in both transitions is the decision of the NA leadership to maintain the NA’s 
neutral organizational integrity and the cohesion maintained by the NA rank and file. Most 
critically, the leadership was concerned about the possible disintegration of the NA should 
it unnecessarily assert any partisan interest.229 Overall, the decision by the NA leadership 
to maintain institutional stability during these different political transitions demonstrates 
an institutional culture stronger than any politically charged individual ambitions to grab 
political power.  
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1. The Case of Cooption and Firm Civilian Control 
When compared to 1990 and the events following the 2006 transition, the political 
circumstances of 1951 and 1960 were very different, as they did not result in tense CMR. 
The cooption of the Rana leadership by the new system on one hand resolved the potential 
CMR tension, and on the other, it took a heavy toll on the organizational integrity of the 
NA. The organizational disintegration of the NA as a political decision brought upon the 
NA by the government was a byproduct of Rakshya Dal’s revolt in 1952.230 Bhuwan Lal 
Joshi’s and Leo E. Rose’s work, Democratic Innovations in Nepal: A Case Study of 
Political Acculturation, states that “the vulnerability of the government to an armed 
coup….demonstrated the need for a reliable, well-disciplined army.”231 This sudden 
decrease in the NA’s numeric strength rendered the NA ineffective even to secure its 
borders, resulting in the establishment of Indian military posts stationed along the Nepal-
China border out of Indian concerns over communist China.232 Likewise, in 1960, the NA 
accepted the authority of the supreme commander (King Mahendra) enshrined in the 
Government of Nepal Act 1951, which negated potential CMR tension.233 As discussed in 
the Chapter II, “There was no ‘Young Turk’ faction in the Nepal state army with 
pronounced political views and ambitions.”234 The CMR during this period remained 
under firm civilian control (though not democratic), and its impact on the organization was 
positive. The NA’s size grew in accordance with the increasing roles and function being 
entrusted to it by the supreme commander, both nationally through internal deployments 
and internationally through UN peacekeeping missions.  
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2. The Case of CMR Tension 
 Unlike the previous transitions, the political transition in the 1990s and post-2006 
presented a tense setting for the CMR of the country and a test of the NA’s ability to 
maintain neutrality. In both the settings, the NA illustrated its institutional strength and the 
ability to contain dissent. CMR tensions initially took center stage in 1990, when the NA 
leadership, the Chief of Army Staff General Satchit Samsher Jung Bahadur Rana, led a 
team of generals to convince the Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai to have the NA 
remain under the supreme command of the constitutional monarch rather than under 
partisan control.235 The NA leadership disseminated the same viewpoint to its rank and 
file so that it could relay this request to the constitution recommendations commission, 
formed to collect national-level recommendations to be incorporated in the new 
constitution.236 The NA’s concern, as described earlier, was of being placed under the sole 
command of the executive, which could compromise the neutral stance of the national 
army. Different political stakeholders in the constitution drafting commission, however, 
understood this initiative as the NA’s push to undermine democracy.237  
The events following the promulgation of the 1990 constitution never resulted in a 
power grab by the NA, however. Instead, the CMR tension from the military’s perspective 
arose from its desire to maintain its neutrality constitutionally in the context of a highly 
competitive partisan politics, by demonstrating organizational cohesiveness and 
leadership. As a result of the tension, an agreeable middle path was formulated by the 
constitution drafting commission. Organizationally, Article 118 established the National 
Security Council with the powers to mobilize the NA.238 The NA maintained its neutrality, 
remaining under the supreme command of the head of state and a non-partisan 
constitutional monarch. This instance demonstrates that the decision making of the NA 
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during a major shift of political power aimed to avoid being dragged into partisan politics 
and losing its neutral stance. Moreover, the organizational cohesion being maintained in 
the NA rank and file during this political crisis gave the NA a firm base to convince the 
prime minister and the constitution recommendations committee of the importance of the 
NA remaining neutral.  
A still graver CMR tension with more severe consequences for the NA’s cohesion 
and institutional integrity ensued after the 2006 transition of political power. Upon 
assuming the office of the prime minister in 2008, the Maoist supremo Pushpa Kamal 
Dahal engaged in transforming the state institutions according to Maoist agenda.239 The 
firing of the Chief of Army Staff General Rookmangud Katwal in 2009 by the prime 
minister was a deliberate effort to assert Maoist interest in the NA.240 The situation 
produced stiff resistance from the military leadership, which awaited the decision of the 
supreme commander (the president), as the prime minister’s decision was not 
constitutionally guaranteed. The firing was eventually revoked by President Ram Baran 
Yadav, and the opposition, including the civil society, were against the move.241 As a 
result, the move polarized the constituent assembly in favor of the president’s decision.242 
Since the interim constitution did not explicitly have a clause for the removal or 
reinstatement of the army chief, the constitutionality of the decision of both the prime 
minister and the president became debatable.  
Meanwhile, the NA leaders facing the CMR challenge brought about by the 2006 
political transition maintained the cohesion of the institution, amidst rumors in the media 
about the ongoing dispute among the leadership of the NA. The top three leaders, namely, 
and in order of seniority, General Rookmangud Katawal, General Kul Bahadur Khadka, 
and General Chattra Man Singh Gurung, issued a joint statement dismissing the rumors 
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and confirming the general public that there were no disagreements in the NA’s chain of 
command.243 Despite efforts of the Maoists to influence the NA’s loyalty by forcing a 
change in leadership, the leadership was able to steer the organization away from political 
partisanship.  
Juxtaposing the two CMR incidents of 1990 and 2009, the decision making of the 
NA leadership demonstrated a pattern of standing firmly for the institutional integrity and 
cohesion of the NA. These incidents took place in different times in totally different 
political settings, and under different leadership. Both manifested a similar pattern of 
behavior from the NA leadership, however. In both cases, the NA leadership took a stand 
against the assertions of partisan interests in the national army while maintaining the 
cohesion of the NA rank and file during times of political transition. The cohesion of the 
NA acted to safeguard the neutrality of the NA. The decisions were therefore institutionally 
driven as opposed to individual decisions.  
B. SELF-PRESERVATION OBLIGATIONS 
This pattern of institutional decision making with regards to the NA’s neutrality, 
cohesion, and institutional integrity arises from the self-preservation instincts of the NA, 
derived largely from historical precedence and recurrent political interventions in the 
security institutions of Nepal. The NA’s institutional memory holds accounts of 
organizational dismantling in response to perceived political threat. Similarly, the post-
1990 interventions in other security agencies such as the Nepal police, by the political 
parties, also contributes to the self-preservation instincts of the NA. These precedents 
collectively contribute to the self-preservation instincts of the NA as an institution, 
particularly since the transition of 1990, because they drive the NA to keep out of 
politics.244 
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1. Political Alignment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to Coups 
 The immediate aftermath of the fall of the Rana regime created two issues that held 
important lessons for the NA: the perception of the NA being politically loyal to the Ranas 
among the new political elites and the politically motivated rebellion by Rakshya Dal. They 
both had a political flavor, and eventually, they did not go well for the NA. Together, they 
triggered the modernization of the NA by the new political elites in an effort to diminish 
the threat of armed rebellion by the NA. Consequently, they dramatically reduced the size 
of the NA, rendering it ineffective to the point of having to rely on the Indian military to 
secure Nepal’s borders.245 These events inculcated the importance of maintaining a 
professional posture in the NA for preserving its institutional integrity. 
The NA’s first critical lesson in self-preservation occurred with the transition of 
1950, when the NA was immediately labeled as a Rana-loyal military by members of the 
NC. The political elites’ drive to modernize the NA was in fact to “end Rana traditions in 
the army.”246 The Rana elites were co-opted by the new system, evident from the 
formation of the first cabinet, consisting of half Rana ministers (also generals by rank) and 
half NC ministers, headed by a Rana prime minister.247 The king assumed the position of 
the NA’s supreme commander through the Government of Nepal Act of 1951.248 The 
NA’s loyalty was now bound by this act, which replaced the Government of Nepal Act of 
1948 which had the Rana premier as the commander in chief. Yet, despite the new system 
in effect, the NC members in the cabinet were not confident of the NA’s loyalty to the new 
system. 
The NC-led government’s lack of confidence in the national army rebounded on 
the NA when the Rakshya Dal rebelled. In January 21, 1952 the Rakshya Dal, a 
paramilitary force established to rehabilitate the armed faction of the NC, revolted, 
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exposing the “vulnerability of the government to an armed coup.”249 They seized 
important government offices and installations such as the secretariat, the prisons, the 
communications installations, and some military ammunition depots.250 The king declared 
a state of emergency and “invested Prime Minister Koirala with full power to govern 
without the advice of the Cabinet, if deemed necessary.”251 The Rashtriya Mahasabha (a 
political party) and the communist party linked to the incident were declared illegal.252 
The incident, also commonly known as the K.I. Singh episode, named after the leader of 
the rebellion, was eventually crushed by the NA.  
In addition to punishing the Rakshya Dal, however, the government also invited the 
Indian military mission to reorganize and modernize the NA in 1952, illustrating an 
increased need for military modernization.253 The Rakshya Dal was disbanded and 
absorbed into the Nepal Police and some into the NA, but the logic of having to punish the 
NA also emanated from the government’s perception of the NA’s perceived political 
alignment with the Ranas. As a result, the NA was reorganized into a smaller institution. 
This massive reduction of the NA’s size was a difficult lesson for the NA. This early 
inability to preserve its institutional integrity became embedded in the institutional memory 
of the NA, which constantly reminds the NA of the consequences of having political 
alignments and the government’s sensitivity to its vulnerability to coups from the armed 
forces.254  
2. Learning from Political Interference in the Security Sector  
 Likewise, the partisan assertions that are conspicuous in the NA’s sister 
organizations in the security apparatus have presented stark examples for the NA to 
preserve its institutional integrity and cohesion by staying away from partisan political 
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alignments. The Nepal Police are increasingly politicized, especially since the 1990s, and 
the issue has become more apparent, particularly after 2006. The post-1990 democratic 
discussion to reorient the police force to a “people-focused service” was diminished as a 
result of politicization of the force by the parties.255 As a result, the negative effect in the 
morale of “competitive police officers” (professional and with no political affiliations) also 
served “to inculcate wrong values in the minds of young entrants to premier services,” 
which is a major concern for the police force in general.256 The post-2006 removal and 
replacement of high-ranking police officers by various administrations have become a 
challenge for the police force. According to an op-ed published in myRebublica [Sic], a 
prominent Nepali newspaper and a partner of The New York Times, the “political 
interference….inside the police organization have perverted leadership succession and 
affected organizational integrity.”257 The often criticized but hardly addressed issue of 
partisan assertion in the police force serves as an example for the NA to avoid at all cost 
as it clearly politicizes the organization, particularly considering similar efforts of partisan 
assertions in the NA after the 1990 transition of power. The post-1990 political assertions 
have also been highlighted by the retired Chief of Army Staff Gerenal Rookmangud 
Katawal in an interview hosted by Image Channel, a prominent Nepali television 
channel.258  
Similar political interference in the NA to replace the Chief of Army Staff in service 
of a partisan agenda were witnessed after the 2006 transition of power. The decision to 
replace General Pyar Jung Thapa in 2006 and the decision to remove General Katawal in 
2009 are examples of such efforts to assert partisan influences.259 Interestingly, the former 
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case did not result in a CMR tension, nor did it result in the removal of the Chief of Army 
Staff. The latter required presidential endorsement to reinstate the Chief of Army Staff, 
which resulted in the resignation of the prime minister. In both cases, the self-preservation 
instinct to protect the institutional cohesion and neutrality of the NA swayed the decision-
making processes. From a CMR perspective, it can be argued that the NA’s actions during 
these instances were outright disobedience of the executive as suggested by S.D. Muni in 
his paper Nepal in Crisis.260 But in Nepal’s case, the political circumstances were driven 
by ulterior partisan motives without legitimate ground. They were done with the motive to 
bend the loyalty of a neutral and cohesive force, to make it a political one as “the Maoist 
secretariat had decided to immediately sack him” (General Katawal).261 Essentially, the 
self-preservation instinct of the NA has made it resistant to partisan influences, which in 
turn maintains the NA’s neutral character and automatically averts military intervention in 
politics. 
C. REINTERPRETING MOTIVES INHIBITING MILITARY 
INTERVENTION  
 Nepal’s case illustrated some aspects of Finer’s concept of “motives inhibiting the 
military from intervention” but at the same time, it also challenges some important 
notions.262 His reasons for the lack of the military’s intervention in politics are akin to 
institutional influencers of the NA—particularly the three inhibiting factors that may stop 
the military from intervening in politics—yet their implications are different in Nepal. He 
argues that professionalism is not the silver bullet that inhibits militaries from intervening 
in politics, because it usually takes a professional military to pull off a successful coup, but 
it is still a necessary factor that may work in most cases.263 Likewise, he argues “fear for 
the fighting capacity of the armed forces, or of a civil war tearing them in two, or even for 
their future as a force of any kind” can contribute to coup-circumventing behavior of the 
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military.264 But, above all, he points to the “acceptance of the principle of civil supremacy” 
by the military being vital to the military not intervening in politics. Observing the NA 
through Finer’s lens, one can argue that the NA’s institutional obligations have them all, 
but with a twist when it comes to fear.265  
The NA’s behavior in all transitions of power since the 1950s conforms to the 
behavior of a professional military and exhibits acceptance of the principle of civil 
supremacy. Often scholars consider the royal takeovers of King Mahendra in 1960 and 
King Gyanendra in 2002 as military coups.266 Technically, however, they are not military 
coups because legally the civil-supremacy of the king has to be factored in. The 
constitutionality of the monarch’s use of the military in both cases was definitely a legal 
battle, and observers remain highly polarized about whether they were. As for the NA, it 
continues to conform to the principle of civilian supremacy, because, as Huntington 
suggests, the king was just as civilian as any parliamentarians.267  
The twist, however, is in the fear factor as identified by Finer, which in the NA 
manifested itself as a resistance to partisan political interference as opposed to submitting 
to undue political pressure. This fear contributed to the professional behavior. The NA’s 
institutional decision making during the 1990 and 2006 transition of power, including the 
2009 CMR tension, therefore shows a pattern of institutional behavior aimed at preserving 
the institutional integrity. This institutional integrity is vital to the NA’s fighting capacity, 
as it prevents the NA from being torn apart by a civil war, as Finer argued. The NA 
leadership’s institutional concerns about organizational integrity can therefore be 
understood as fear motivated. Instead of submitting to party assertions, however, the NA 
stood its ground to maintain its fighting capacity, prevent a civil war, and preserve the 
future of a cohesive NA. Resisting civilian authority in power may sound like the loss of 
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civilian control over the military, but the resistance in the NA’s case led to the maintenance 
civilian authority. Therefore, the decisions of the NA leadership were institutionally 
motivated, to keep the NA neutral and institutionally cohesive, and to preserve the sanctity 
of the concept of legitimate civil supremacy. 
D. CONCLUSION 
 The decision making of the NA leadership through various political transitions has 
provided constant evidence that it arises from institutional sources rather than individual 
leaders. Similarly, the decisions clearly emanate from concerns of potential political 
partisan assertions, subjugating the cohesion of the neutral force that the NA strives to 
remain. Historical precedents of disintegration as well as organizational challenges faced 
by other security agencies, as a result of political interference, are strongly embedded in 
the NA’s institutional memory. Eventually, these factors collectively work to circumvent 
coups on the NA’s behalf. 
Similarly, in comparing the NA’s institutional obligations and Finer’s argument of 
“motives inhibiting the military to intervene,” it is evident that the NA has its own way of 
remaining out of politics. The NA’s actions and leadership decisions have stood the test of 
time, and without a coup since the 1950s. The hard-learnt lessons of organizational 
disintegration in 1952, the political assertions of 1990, 2006, and 2009, and the examples 
of sister organizations are a stark reminder and an answer to why the NA strives to remain 
cohesive and neutral and avoid staging coups d’état as an obligation. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The investigation found that the inherent institutional attributes of the NA are 
primarily responsible for circumventing coups despite frequent openings for the NA to 
intervene. Nepal’s frequent political transitioning between various governments and 
regime types have tested the NA’s susceptibility to coups d’états. The legal provisions (i.e., 
of the government at the time), the will of the people, and the NA’s institutional memory 
have been the major restraints that helped to shape its institutional character since the 
1950s. Essentially, the NA has accepted transitions of power and is likely to repeat the 
same given similar circumstances. There are misconceptions on much of the literature 
about the legalities of how and why the NA is mobilized in various roles, which 
misrepresents the fact that the NA mobilizes within the legal framework. Overall, the 
findings of this study illustrate that the dominant CMR theories of military intervention in 
politics do not reflect the case of Nepal. 
A. THEORIES DO NOT LINE UP IN NEPAL 
 The CMR theories of military intervention in politics do not account for why the 
NA has not intervened in Nepali politics. The political landscape of Nepal transcended 
Finer’s description of Nepal as a unique “proto-dynastic regime,” becoming a federal 
democratic republic.268 In between, the country also experimented with the “guided 
democracy” of the Panchayat system, followed by multiparty democracy under a 
constitutional monarch.269 Nepal’s political development since the 1950s can perhaps 
more accurately be described via Finer’s notion of “countries of low political culture” 
where “there is no clear and well established political formula.”270 In such cases, Finer 
expects the military to intervene in politics and easily “reshape it by a new political formula 
 
268 Samuel Edward Finer, The Man on Horseback (NJ: Transaction Publisher, Rutgers, 2006), 3–4. 
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which legitimizes their own pretentions.”271 All transitions of political power in Nepal 
since the 1950s have established a new political system, however, without triggering a 
military rule, even during political transitions that were mired in CMR tensions. The 
recurring absence of military intervention in Nepali politics is therefore a deliberate effort 
on the NA’s part, emanating from its institutional attributes. 
The lack of military coups in Nepal in spite of the low level of political culture 
challenges Finer’s arguments of military intervention in politics. In Nepal, despite the 
presence of “both disposition and opportunity to intervene,” Finer’s calculus of 
intervention did not result in a coup.272 Furthermore, Nepal’s case continues to contradict 
Perlmutter’s theory of praetorianism that results from declining social conditions, and even 
Desch’s threat-related CMR theory vis-à-vis military intervention in politics as a result of 
domestic political violence.273 Why the theories of military intervention in politics do not 
explain Nepal’s case is a pressing question requiring answers.  
The argument put forward by Finer to explain the motives inhibiting the military 
from intervention may relate to Nepal’s case to an extent. However, a reinterpretation of 
Finer’s argument vis-à-vis the NA’s case is necessary to contextualize his theory. He 
highlights three factors that inhibit the military from intervention—professionalism, fear 
for the fighting capacity or being torn in a civil war, and the acceptance of civil 
supremacy.274 He also explains, however, that professionalism can be a double-edged 
weapon (i.e., it takes a professional military to stage a successful coup). Similarly, 
accepting civil supremacy in practice requires institutional backing, which can be noticed 
in the NA’s case during the CMR tensions of 1990, 2006, and 2009. The logic of fear for 
the fighting capacity and the fear of being torn in a civil war are valid concerns of the NA, 
as they relate to the NA’s cohesiveness and institutional integrity. The NA resisted civilian 
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interference, however, as opposed to submitting to political pressure in 1990, 2006, and 
2009, in order to maintain its cohesiveness and institutional integrity. In CMR parlance, 
these instances can be interpreted as refusal of civil supremacy, if not put in the right 
context. Therefore, adding the institutional attributes inherent in the NA to Finer’s 
argument (motives inhibiting the military from intervention) makes the argument complete 
and comparable in the NA’s case. 
B. THE THREE REASONS 
 There are three overlapping and interrelated rationales as to why the NA repeatedly 
circumvents coups, defying the CMR logic of military intervention in politics: The NA’s 
neutral political relationship with the state, its institutionally influenced decision making, 
and the institutional self-preservation instincts of the NA.  
First, it is of utmost importance to the NA to maintain its politically neutral 
character. This neutrality maintains the NA’s grassroot-level popularity and allows the NA 
to present itself as a professional entity rather than a political force. In essence, neutrality 
fosters trust in the NA among the political elites, which has manifested through the 
incumbent governments’ interaction with the NA, particularly after the military 
modernization efforts of 1952. As a result, the NA often finds itself being engaged in 
assisting political transitions to reach a peaceful conclusion instead of exploiting the 
opportune political crisis. Likewise, neutrality presents the NA as an alternative to 
undertake otherwise politically charged problems such as construction projects and 
procurement, though this is a very contentious issue in its own right. The NA’s utility to 
the state as a professional and neutral institution is also conspicuous in the NA’s 
involvement in UN peacekeeping missions, where the NA actively promotes the state’s 
international profile on the one hand, but on the other it also secures NA’s institutional 
wellbeing. Any disturbance in the NA’s neutral political relationship with the state is 
therefore likely to disturb the coup-averse behavior of the NA. 
Second, the NA’s decisions to keep out of politics and circumvent coups is 
institutionally driven. In other words, the institutionally influenced decision making of the 
NA steers the leadership away from acting on personal whims, despite the presence of what 
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Finer describes as opportunity and disposition to intervene, especially during transitions of 
power involving CMR tension. The CMR conflicts that took center stage in Nepal during 
the 1990 political transition and again in 2009, following the 2006 transition of political 
power, manifested this trend in the decision making of the NA leaders. They displayed the 
NA leadership’s consistent decision to protect the organizational cohesion of the NA and 
its institutional integrity from partisan political influences. In particular, they involved a 
show of cohesion among the top tier of the NA leadership, whether in the form of NA 
generals visiting the prime minister concerning the constitutional neutrality of the NA in 
the new constitution of 1990 or a televised joint press statement confirming the NA’s 
cohesiveness from the top three leaders of the NA in 2009.275 Put together, these incidents 
show that the decision making of NA leaders is strongly influenced by the NA’s 
institutional obligation to remain neutral and cohesive and away from partisan political 
motivations. Such decisions have proved to circumvent coups in Nepal’s case. 
Finally, the NA’s decision to circumvent coups arises from its self-preservation 
instincts, formed as a result of historical incidents such as the dissolution of Rakshya Dal 
in 1952, and the post-1990 deleterious partisan political intervention in the NA as well as 
the NA’s sister organization, the Nepal Police. A politically motivated Rakshya Dal being 
disbanded by the then government in 1952 had an impact also on the NA, reducing the 
NA’s size significantly and rendering it incapable to defend the country’s sovereignty. The 
issue of sovereignty therefore became contentious when the Indian military stepped in to 
establish check posts along Nepal’s northern border, citing its concerns about communist 
China.276 These incidents are part and parcel of the NA’s institutional memory, which 
strengthens its self-preservation reflexes. Likewise, partisan political intervention in the 
Nepal Police and its impacts on professional policing have been equally alarming to the 
NA as a security sector member. Similar efforts by the political elites to divide the 
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leadership of the NA, both in 2006 and 2009, were successfully quashed by NA leaders.277 
Evidently, the NA remaining institutionally intact and cohesive during CMR tensions is a 
result of the NA’s self-preservation instincts. In turn, the self-preservation instincts keep 
the NA away from political motivations, and therefore away from coups d’état. 
C. THE VIRTUOUS CIRCLE 
 The three rationales that obligate the NA to circumvent coups d’état form a virtuous 
circle. That is, the three institutional attributes of the NA that circumvent coups reinforce 
one another, “resulting in a continuous process of improvement” and thereby forming a 
cycle.278 For instance, the neutral character of the NA is essential to the NA’s approval by 
the society and the incumbent in power, but it also reinforces the NA’s self-preservation 
instinct. As a result, institutional influence is prominent in the decision making of the NA, 
which is heavily influenced by those self-preservation instincts, derived from the NA’s 
need to remain neutral. Therefore, we see these institutional attributes at play when the NA 
is confronted by a CMR conundrum, which collectively result in the NA’s coup-averse 
behavior. 
The phenomena may have been completely absent in the immediate aftermath of 
the fall of the Rana regime, because in 1952, the disintegration of the NA was allowed by 
the leaders as a result of transition of power, but gradually it evolved. The strengthening of 
the NA during the Panchayat era instilled in the NA the value of being cohesive as an 
institution, and under a common non-partisan leadership. With the political developments 
of 1990, the NA’s institutional memory of disintegration compared with what it had 
become by 1990 meant that the NA had no desire to repeat the history of disintegration. 
Hence, the NA’s push to remain constitutionally under a non-partisan monarch can be 
understood as the first instance of the virtuous circle at play. By 2009, the virtuous circle 
 
277 “Magna Carta - Nepali Times,” Nepali Times, accessed September 20, 2020, 
http://archive.nepalitimes.com/news.php?id=11835#.X2e3kmhKhPY; “Nepal’s Presidential Office Defends 
Move to Reinstate Army Chief,” ProQuest, accessed May 4, 2020, https://search-proquest-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/460031910?rfr_id=info%3Axri%2Fsid%3Aprimo. 
278 Merriam-Webster, s.v. “virtuous circle,” accessed November 11, 2020, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/virtuous+circle. 
74 
had matured, having gone through the process also in 2006. In both 2006 and 2009, the 
partisan assertions in the chain of command of the national army were rejected cohesively 
by the NA. These outcomes were the result of a matured virtuous circle of neutrality, the 
self-preservation instinct, and institutionally influenced decision making reinforcing each 
other. On the one hand, this virtuous circle maintains the NA’s institutional cohesion, and 
on the other, it keeps the NA away from politics, which in turn circumvents coups.  
D. RECOMMENDATION TO CMR SCHOLARS AND DECISION-MAKERS 
1. A Case-Led Approach to Understanding CMR Theories Rather Than 
Pre-accepted Notions Shaped by Normative Planning 
 It is of utmost importance to NA leaders to understand both the evolving nature of 
CMR (i.e., that theories keep evolving) and that CMR is dynamic (i.e., relations are based 
on political developments, as we know from Nepal’s experience that even constitutions 
change). The NA as an institution is already leading CMR discussions regularly at the 
Army Command and Staff College, and therefore the NA has an edge to provide a case-
based approach to teaching CMR theories as it justifies the dynamic nature of CMR.279 
Therefore, a case-led approach to understanding CMR theories is as important as 
understanding the political climate. In understanding the political climate, the factual will 
of the people is the primary consideration as opposed to what is being projected by the 
party cadres, particularly during transitions of political power. 
2. CMR and the National Security of Nepal 
 A thorough deliberation among security experts regarding the role of CMR in the 
development of national security policy, national security strategy, and the defense plan is 
a must. Critical issues in Nepali CMR are often documented by scholars in terms of right 
and wrong or democratic and undemocratic rather than in terms of the impact of CMR on 
national security. For example, Indra Adhikari’s book Military and Democracy in Nepal 
concludes on a rather aspirational and naive note—“only political institutions and a sound 
political culture can make civil-military relations durable”—but her book does not account 
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for the political culture of partisan politics of Nepal that undermine established national 
democratic institutions and how they impact national security.280 To her, the NA is mainly 
a royalist institution requiring democratization, often involved in “Malami, Shalami and 
Gulami” (funeral procession, salute and buttering) among other tasks, but she does not 
consider the constitutional provisions throughout various political transitions to which the 
NA has routinely adhered.281 Her work leaves simple questions unanswered: should the 
military have defied the executive authority being vested in the king, in the post-1960 
scenario? Or should the NA have disregarded the executive authority of the cabinet, 
endorsed by the parliament to fight the Maoists? Or even, should the NA have denounced 
the executive authority of the incumbent government to crack down on violent protestors 
infiltrated by the Maoists (terrorists then) in the thick of a counterinsurgency campaign? 
Or, would not the NA rejecting the executive authority to mobilize at the time be outright 
violation of constitutional provisions? And most importantly, were the NA’s actions 
constitutionally in line with achieving Nepal’s national security concerns as directed by the 
incumbent government? Therefore, a shift in the focus of CMR to its impact on the national 
security of Nepal is necessary, instead of bickering on the rights and wrongs of a very 
dynamic CMR of Nepal. 
E. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The 1952 modernization of the NA and the politics surrounding the event needs a 
thorough study. This event is also a stark reminder of how little literature there is about the 
process. The details are seldom found and are limited to the event being mentioned as a 
political outcome of the fall of the Rana regime as opposed to how the NA went through 
the modernization process as an institution. Interestingly, the rehabilitation of the majority 
of the NA members who were fired (the NA was reduced from 48,000 to 6,000 in the 
modernization process) as a result of the process is completely missing. The research would 
help to understand the CMR of Nepal that created its institutional legacies. 
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